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INTRODUCTION

In June 2002, the policymaking body of the American Medical
Association (AMA) took a dramatic step toward changing the
foundational principles underlying our system of organ donation.
Inviting substantial controversy, the AMA's House of Delegates voted
to encourage research examining whether financial incentives should
be used to increase organ donation.' Such incentives would hopefully
ease the nation's "alarming shortage of donor organs."2 While the new
1. See AMA POLICY H-140.897 § 1, CADAVERIC ORGAN DONATION: ENCOURAGING
THE STUDY OF MOTIVATION (June 18, 2002) (stating that in addition to promoting
voluntary organ donation, "physicians should support innovative approaches to
encourage organ donation" by supporting "and, if appropriate, participati[ng] in the
conduct of ethically designed research studies of financial incentives"). The American
Society of Transplant Surgeons and the United Network for Organ Sharing have also
endorsed such studies. See Andis Robeznieks, Feds Have Final Say on Organ Donor
Initiatives, AM. MED. NEwS, July 22, 2002, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/scipubs/amnews/pick-02/prsc0722.htm.
2. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n, AMA House Supports Studies on Organ
Donation Incentives (July 18, 2002), at http://journals.iranscience.net:800/
Default/www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/1616-6378.html.
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AMA policy encouraged the study of all kinds of donation incentive
programs, the AMA's press release focused on financial incentives,3
as did the national media.'
The fact that a mainstream organization like the AMA would
even consider mixing money and body parts represents a radical shift
in our willingness to seek innovative solutions to the organ shortage.
The AMA and organ donation researchers have failed, however, to
give adequate attention to an alternative donation incentive plan. In
this Article, I propose to encourage organ donation by offering
registered donors preferential access to the organ supply. This policy
would motivate people to register and better recognize the
contribution that registered donors make toward easing the organ
shortage.
The idea of offering allocation priority as a means of encouraging
donor registration has received surprisingly little attention.5 Yet,
such an incentive would lead many more people to become organ
donors and would thereby increase the organ supply and the number
of lives saved by transplant surgery. Even if we offer only a small
priority incentive, the stakes are high enough that we might induce
many more people to register. By contrast, according to a 1993
Gallup poll, about 80% of those surveyed stated that financial

3. See id. ("Concerned with the alarming shortage of donor organs, the [AMA's]
House of Delegate[s] voted today to encourage organ procurement agencies and
transplant centers to study the use of financial incentives to increase organ
donation.").
4. See, e.g., John M. Hubbell, New Support for Rewarding Organ Donations, S.F.
CHRON., June 20, 2002, at A4; Bruce Japsen, AMA: Study Paying for Organ Donation,
CHI. TRIB., June 19, 2002, at 1 ("Among the incentives the AMA debated included tax
credits or payments of $500 to $1,000 toward funeral expenses incurred by the donor
family.").
5. For some exceptions to the rule, see Rupert Jarvis, Join the Club: A Modest
Proposal to Increase Availability of Donor Organs, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS 183 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998); J. Muyskens,
Should Receiving Depend Upon Willingness to Give?, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROC.
2181, 2181-84 (1992); David A. Peters, A Unified Approach to Organ Donor
Recruitment, Organ Procurement,and Distribution, 3 J.L. & HEALTH 157-79 (1988-89);
Richard Schwindt & Aidan Vining, Proposal for a Mutual Insurance Pool for
Transplant Organs, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 725 (1998); JAMES F. BURDICK ET
AL., PREFERRED STATUS FOR ORGAN DONORS: A REPORT OF THE UNITED NETWORK FOR
ORGAN SHARING ETHICS COMMITTEE (June 20, 1993), available at http://www.unos.org/
resources/bioethics.asp?index=5 [hereinafter UNOS ETHICS COMMITTEE]. My proposal
differs most notably from these others by describing how, at least conceptually, a
priority allocation scheme can be made pareto superior to our current distribution
scheme (see discussion infra Part IV) and by describing why we should not fear that
priority incentives will reduce societal altruism or harmfully commodify the human
body. See discussion infra Part V. I also comment on a recent private initiative to
create priority incentives through the mutual agreement of a group of organ donors.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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incentives would have no effect on the likelihood that they would
donate organs.6 Only 12% said that financial incentives would make
them more likely to donate, and as many as 5% said that financial
incentives would make them less likely to donate.7
The Gallup poll did not explore respondents' views on priority
incentives.8 However, because priority incentives offer donors the
possibility of increasing their life expectancy, they provide a strong
motivation to donate. And, unlike financial incentives, priority
incentives can be instituted without passing new legislation and
without raising fears about turning human bodies into cash. Though
these concerns are largely unfounded, they still represent a political
obstacle to the implementation of financial incentives. Many also fear
that financial incentives will have undesirable distributional effects
based on wealth. By contrast, priority incentives would allow people
at all levels of wealth to register for organ priority and provide
wealthier people with neither a reduced burden to donate organs nor
an increased opportunity to receive them.
While it may initially seem unsettling to give preference to some
people over others in a life or death situation, current allocation
policy already reflects a variety of non-medical, value-laden
preferences? Our choice is really to decide which set of preferences to
give and how they should be weighed against each other.
Accordingly, my fundamental goal is not to advocate a particular
system of priority allocation but rather to defend the fundamental
fairness of such allocations and argue that we should use some kind
of non-altruistic incentive, probably priority-based but possibly
financially-based, as a means to ameliorate the current organ
shortage.
Traditionally, organ donation has been viewed as an act of
altruism. One should register to donate, it is said, because doing so
can save a life-an act which is a sufficient reward in itself.1° For all
its rhetorical grandeur, however, such thinking has failed to convince
potential donors. From 1995 to 2000, the number of people waiting
for bodily organs increased by 80%," and there are currently over

6.

THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC., THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S ATTITUDES TOWARD

ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION (Feb. 1993), at 43, available at
http://www.transweb.org/reference/articles/gallup-survey/gallup-index.html.
Given
that pollsters did not mention the size of financial incentives, we should not be overly
reliant on responses to this question.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 50-55.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 189-95.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF TRANSPLANTATION,
GUIDELINES FOR DONOR REGISTRY DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE: FINAL REPORT (Aug.
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82,000 people on waiting lists. 2 Each year in the United States, over
six thousand of these people die waiting, 13 while thousands more
suffer in great distress waiting for an organ to become available.
Moreover, the number of deaths on waiting lists dramatically
understates the severity of the shortage. Many are excluded from
even entering a waiting list because they are considered too sick to
receive an organ given that organs are in such short supply. 4
Similarly, due to the shortage, many patients on waiting lists are
removed when they become too sick to receive a transplant. 5
Behind the story of the organ shortage lurks the troubling fact
that its severity is largely due to our own making. The shortage is
traceable to policies and practices of health care personnel, to
individuals and families who refuse to donate, and to our legal and
regulatory regimes which fail to offer non-altruistic donation
incentives. Even one unnecessary, preventable death is a tragedy.
Yet, more than 6,000 people die each year on transplant waiting lists,
while it is estimated that between 7,000 and 23,000 bodies that could
have been used for transplantation are buried, cremated, or
otherwise returned to dust. If the life-sustaining organs from each
2002), at iii, available at http://www.organdonor.gov/execsum.htm. During the same
period, the number of cadaveric donors increased by less than 12%. Id.
12. UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, ORGAN DONORS ARE HEROES, at
http://www.unos.org (last visited Aug. 25, 2003).
13. Dave Wendler & Neal Dickert, The Consent Process for Cadaveric Organ
Procurement: How Does It Work? How Can It Be Improved?, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
329, 329 (2001) (noting that, in 1999, "6448 [people] had died while waiting for an
organ"); THE ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, ABOUT
DONATION - THE CRITICAL SHORTAGE, at http://www.optn.org/about/donation/
criticalShortage.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2003) (indicating that 6,439 patients on
organ waiting lists died in 2001).
14. It has been estimated that some 100,000 people in the United States may die
each year before even being accepted to an organ waiting list. Frederick R. Parker, Jr.
et al., Organ Procurement and Tax Policy, 2002 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 173, 174
(2002); see also WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 767-68
(1998) (noting that many patients are excluded from consideration for transplantation
due to hepatitis B, HIV, certain cancers, and advanced heart or lung disease).
15. For example, in 2002, 1,868 people on the waiting list were removed when they
became too sick to receive a transplant. UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING,
WAITING
LIST REMOVALS,
REMOVAL
REASONS BY YEAR,
available at
http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2003). It is likely
that many of these patients would not have become so sick had they received a
transplant sooner.
16. DAVID L. KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM,
A PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM 4 (2002). The authors note:
Of the 2 million or so deaths that occur in the United States each year,
estimates indicate that somewhere between 13,000 and 29,000 occur under
circumstances that would allow the organs of the deceased to be
transplanted. Of those, only 5,843 (or 28 percent of the middle of the range of
prior estimates) yielded organ donations in 1999.
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of these eligible donors were offered to desperate people on waiting
lists, we might eliminate all, or at least a substantial number, of the
deaths in the U.S. which result from organ scarcity." The good news
is that the laws, policies, and practices that have exacerbated the
organ shortage can be changed to increase the number of organs that
are actually transplanted.
In Part II of this Article, I describe much of the law governing
organ transplantation in the U.S., as well as the allocation policies
which have been adopted to rank those on waiting lists. In Part III, I
briefly discuss other proposals to increase organ donation and
explore the nature of our moral obligations to donate and to respect
the donation preferences of others.
Elements of these proposals are used in the formulation of the
priority incentive plan that I advocate in Part IV. There, I give a
high-level description of how priority incentives can be implemented
under government oversight. I note that it is at least conceptually
possible to structure such a program so that everyone's expected
waiting time-whether one is a registered donor or not-is shorter
than it is under the current system. If such a plan could be
implemented, there would be little ground to object to the priority
allocation vis-h-vis our current allocation. In addition, until we have
a national priority incentive program, I argue that we can help
overcome the bureaucratic inertia which perpetuates our current
allocation system by implementing priority incentives through the
mutual agreement of private groups of organ donors.
In Part V, I reveal what I take to be the stunning hypocrisy of
our entrenched system of organ donation which, in the name of
altruism, leads to unnecessary, preventable pain and death. To do so,

Id. (citations omitted). The numbers in the text are generated by subtracting the
approximately 6,000 bodies actually used in transplantation from these estimates of
total bodies eligible for transplantation. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, VARIATION IN ORGAN DONATION AMONG TRANSPLANT

CENTERS (May 2003), at 1, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-0200210.pdf (estimating "that 12,000 to 15,000 deaths annually could yield organs
eligible for transplantation").
17. See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 16 ("[Tlhe organ shortage is the product
of a failed public policy, not of nature."); Leonard H. Bucklin, Woe Unto Those Who
Request Consent: Ethical and Legal Considerations in Rejecting a Deceased's
Anatomical Gift Because There is No Consent By the Survivors, 78 N. DAK. L. REV. 323,
324 (2002); Jarvis, supra note 5, at 183 ("The problem is not that there are insufficient
numbers of organs potentially suitable for transplantation, but that these organs, far
from being made available for transplant, are destroyed .. "). But cf Arthur L.
Caplan, Is Xenografting Morally Wrong?, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 121,
123 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998) ("Even if drastic changes were
made in existing public policies, other factors are working against the prospects for
large increases in the human cadaver organ supply.").
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I respond to two critiques of donation incentives." The first critique
says that one should donate organs principally for altruistic reasons
and that the existence of non-altruistic incentives debases the
altruistic nature of our current system. I argue that the current
system is not nearly as altruistic as it is purported to be and that we
cannot use altruism as a ground to defend the status quo when we
know that the status quo leads to so much unnecessary suffering.
A second, related critique asserts that donation incentives
inappropriately introduce market-style transactions into the transfer
of human organs. Defenders of this position argue that human body
parts are invested with special elements of personal identity that are
debased when organs are traded like market commodities. Perhaps
surprisingly, this criticism has been leveled at both financial and
priority incentives. I argue that these concerns are weak as applied
to either; however, they are particularly inapplicable to priority
incentives because such incentives do not involve the kind of
monetary exchange usually associated with market commodities.
The scope of my discussion is limited to cadaveric organ donation
where organs are donated from the recently deceased to those still
living. 9 By contrast, live organ donors provide an organ or part of an
organ to another living person." For example, one can donate a single
kidney or part of a lung or liver to a friend, relative, or even a
stranger. Such transplantations put donors at risk of complications
from surgery and from living with reduced function in the organ
systems from which they donate.2 ' Given these risks, we cannot do
much to encourage live donation simply by offering live donors
priority in someday receiving an organ."
Under limited

18. I follow the standard convention of referring to all organ transfers as
"donations," even when organs are transferred for financial or in-kind compensation.
19. Virtually all cadaveric donors have been declared brain dead, although some
physicians have developed protocols for declaring death in "non-heart-beating
cadavers." Alexander M. Capron, Reexamining Organ Transplantation, 285 J. AM.
MED. AS'N 334, 335 (2001).
20. A third kind of transplantation, known as "xenotransplantation," transfers
organs from animals, like apes and pigs, into humans. See Caplan, supra note 17, at
123; Traci J. Hoffman, Organ Donor Laws in the U.S. and U.K.: The Need for Reform
and the Promise of Xenotransplantation, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 339 (2000);
Adam Kolber, Note, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and
OtherApes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163, 193-95 (2001).
21. "Doctors estimate the risk of death to liver donors to be 10 to 20 in 10,000
compared with 3 in 10,000 for kidney donors." Denise Grady, Healthy Give Organs to
Dying, Raising Issue of Risk and Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at Al. Some
estimates are even more severe. See, e.g., Mary Carmichael, Risking Life to Give Life,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 22, 2002, at 53 (stating that adult live liver transplantation "defies
the doctor's cardinal rule to do no harm-new statistics show that 10 percent of donors
will have complications, and 1 percent will die").
22. Interestingly, live kidney donors already receive some priority should they
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circumstances, however, there are analogous forms of in-kind
compensation that can be provided to live donors. 3 As a place to
start, I focus on cadaveric donation incentives because most organs
are transplanted from cadavers,24 and some organs can only be
transplanted from cadavers. In addition, cadaveric donation is less
expensive than live donation, 5 poses no risk to donors (who are
deceased at the time of donation), and raises fewer ethical concerns
than does live donation.2"
II.

THE CURRENT ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND ALLOCATION SYSTEM

This section outlines the laws and regulations that govern organ
donation and allocation in the United States. Given that our
formulas for organ allocation already include a variety of value-laden
judgments about who should have priority access to organs, it takes
no great leap in moral thinking to provide some priority to those who
register to donate and, thereby, help to reduce the scarcity which
leads to the need for allocation in the first place.
A.

The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act

By the mid-1960s, organ transplantation technology had made
substantial strides, 7 and the National Conference of Commissioners
someday need a cadaveric kidney. See UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, POLICY
3.5.11.6: DONATION STATUS, available at http://www.unos.org/PoliciesandBylaws/
policies/pdfs/policy_7.pdf (last modified July 27, 2003). Live kidney donors, having
undergone transplant surgery and having only one kidney left, are more likely to need
a kidney transplant than the average person. Thus, even with priority, live kidney
donors are worse off than they were before they donated. Priority for live kidney
donors, at best, reduces the disincentive to donate but does not serve independently to
encourage live donation.
23. For a discussion of paired organ exchanges, see infra text accompanying notes
139-41; ROBERT M. VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICS 186-202 (2000); Michael T.
Morley, Note, Increasing the Supply of Organs for Transplantation Through Paired
Organ Exchanges, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y. REV. 221 (2003).
24. In terms of bodies, there are slightly more live donors than cadaveric donors.
See Sarah Lueck, The Gift of Life Is Mainly Coming from Life Itself, WALL ST. J., Apr.
23, 2002, at D4. However, more transplanted organs come from cadaveric donors
because each cadaver can provide lifesaving organs to several people.
25. See Andrew C. MacDonald, Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to Refocus
the Ethical Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 177, 179 (1997) ("When a living donor is
used, the costs of the transplant increase dramatically. Living donors spend up to a
week in the hospital and require pain medication for up to a month after the surgery,
in addition to follow-up visits to the physician's office.").
26. See Grady, supra note 21 ("Increasingly, surgeons are telling people who need
transplants that their relatives, spouses and friends are potential organ donors,"
creating "pressures on families that did not exist before. In some cases people as young
as 19 are being asked to act as liver donors for their parents.").
27. The first successful cadaveric kidney transplant occurred in the Soviet Union
in 1936. Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic
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on Uniform State Laws saw a need to remedy the difficulty under
then-current law of making a binding premortem organ donation.28 In
1968, the Conference approved the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA), now adopted in some form by all fifty states. 9 Importantly,
the UAGA gave competent adults the right to donate their bodies or
bodily organs for use upon their death" and to do so, as indicated in a
comment, "without subsequent veto by others."3 It specified "the
manner of making the gift, the rights and duties at death, and the
immunity from civil or criminal liability of persons who acted in good
'
faith in accord with the provisions of the act."32
Prior to its creation,
donation laws were "a confusing mixture of old common law dating
back to the seventeenth century and state statutes that have been
enacted from time to time."33
With the severity of organ scarcity increasing, the Conference
approved an amended UAGA in 1987,"4 which has been adopted in
whole or in part by twenty-four states.3 The UAGA of 1987 gives
explicit priority to the expressed intentions of donors over their
relatives.36 For example, it "adds an option (implicit but unexpressed
in the 1968 UAGA)" 7 that one can choose not to have one's organs
donated at death, even if one's family later desired to do so. The
UAGA of 1987 was also noticeably different from its predecessor in
that it echoed federal legislation passed in 1984 that prohibited
commerce in bodily organs.38

Incentives for Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES L. & MED. 213, 214 (2001). Two
decades later, doctors in the United States successfully transplanted a kidney from a
live donor. Id. Then, in 1967, doctors in South Africa successfully transplanted the
first human heart. Id.
28. Capron, supra note 19, at 334.
29. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968), Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has
Been Adopted, 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993 & Supp. 2002).
30. Id. § 2(a) ("Any individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or more may give
all or any part of his body for any purpose specified [in the Act].
31. Id. § 2 cmts.
32. Robert E. Sullivan, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, in ORGAN AND TISSUE
DONATION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 19, 22 (Bethany Spielman ed. 1996).
33. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968), Prefatory Note.
34. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987), Historical Note.
35. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987), Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has
Been Adopted.
36. Id. § 2(h). As later discussed, however, it is unlikely that medical professionals
will act contrary to familial wishes. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
37. Sullivan, supra note 32, at 25.
38. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10 (1987); National Organ Transplant Act §
301, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
274(e) (2000)).
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The National Organ TransplantAct

In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA)39 in order to "strengthen the ability of the nation's health
care system to provide organ transplants"" through the development
of a nationwide organ network that can respond quickly to changes in
organ allocation and procurement policies.41 In addition to instituting
a national ban on commercial transactions in organs,42 NOTA
authorized the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services to establish an Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network (OPTN) by contract with a private, nonprofit entity.43 As
part of its mission, the OPTN is specifically required to "work
actively to increase the supply of donated organs."' Ever since the
first contract was awarded in 1986, the OPTN has been operated by
the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS)."
UNOS maintains "a national list of individuals who need organs"
and a national system that uses "established medical criteria to
match organs and individuals included in the list." 6 UNOS is a
membership organization that includes "transplant surgery centers,
medical laboratories that perform tests for organ matching, volunteer
and advocacy groups, donors and donor families, transplant
recipients and patients awaiting a transplant."7 As part of its central
task, it coordinates activities and information-sharing among its
member Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs)" which are
distributed regionally across the country. The motivating idea behind
this somewhat tortuous system-in which the Department of Health
and Human Services awards a contract (currently to UNOS) to
operate a national organ network (called an OPTN)-was to keep the
organ distribution system out of the hands of government
bureaucracy and to give medical professionals (often working as part
of regional OPOs) significant control over the nation's organ
procurement and allocation systems. 9
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274.
40. H.R. REP. No. 98-575, pt. 1, at 6 (1983).
41. Id. at 6-7.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 274(a).
43. Id. § 274(a), (b)(1).
44. Id. § 274(b)(2)(K).
45. CURRAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 767.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii).
47. CURRAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 767.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2); see also id. § 273 (setting criteria for organ procurement
organizations to receive government funding). An OPO "has a defined service area that
is of sufficient size to assure maximum effectiveness in the procurement and equitable
distribution of organs." Id. § 273(b)(1)(F).
49. H.R. REP. No. 98-575, at 9 (1984).
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In accord with its statutory authority, UNOS issues allocation
guidelines for regional OPOs to follow."0 The allocation policy is
different for each organ, but all of these formulas trade off between a
complicated set of factors. The criteria generally include organ
compatibility, the likelihood that a transplant will be successful, the
time a recipient has spent on a waiting list, and the urgency with
which the patient needs an organ in order to survive or avoid
irreparable injury.5' These criteria frequently come into conflict. For
example, younger and healthier people generally have the best
prognosis for transplant success but their relative health means that
having a transplant is less medically urgent.2
Substantial allocation preference is also given to recipients who
live closer to a particular donor.53 Geographic preference does reflect
some medical considerations (it is speedier and safer to transfer
organs locally), but it also reflects the belief that people will donate
in larger numbers if they see the benefits of donation in their local
community.54 In practice, the medical urgency of one's need for an
organ is often dwarfed by the policy decision to distribute organs
according to a system of local geographic preference. Not
surprisingly, these geographic preferences are controversial.55
The flexibility of our distribution system, which combines clinical
indicators with policy considerations, makes it relatively easy to add
a new policy consideration to the mixture without overhauling the
entire system. Such a consideration might affect one's expected
waiting time by, say, 10% or less. In Part IV, I argue that our organ
allocation system could make willingness to donate just such a policy
consideration by assigning some preference to people who both need
organs and have previously registered as organ donors.

50.

CURRAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 767

51.
52.

See id.
See Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho, Allocation and Rationing, in THE

ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 247, 247 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds.,

1998).
53. CURRAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 767.
54. More cynical observers have suggested that the policy reflects the political
influence of smaller, local transplant centers which fear losing business to larger, more
celebrated and sophisticated centers that would have a competitive advantage under a
national distribution system. See generally Jeffrey Prottas, The Politics of
Transplantation, in

ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION:

ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY

ISSUES 3 (Bethany Spielman ed. 1996).
55. See, e.g., Brigid McMenamin, Why People Die Waiting for Transplants,FORBES,
Mar. 11, 1996, at 140, 140.
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NON-PRIORITY PROPOSALS TO INCREASE DONATION

In this part, I briefly discuss a variety of non-priority proposals
to increase the organ supply. These proposals provide background
information and help frame the contours of the organ donation
debate. Importantly, most of the proposals discussed should not be
viewed as exclusive of each other, since they can be combined in
various ways. For example, a hybrid priority-financial incentive
program could give registered donors priority should they need a
transplant and, should they die with transplant-eligible organs, the
program could provide a death benefit to the decedent's estate."
Because many of the proposals discussed can coexist with a
priority incentive program, it is not my goal to argue that priority
incentives are necessarily better than these other proposals. Rather,
I argue that a priority incentive program should be, but so far has
not been, considered at least as carefully as these others.
A.

Public Awareness

The least controversial way to ease the organ shortage is to
increase public awareness about donation. 7 There are many who
would be willing to have their organs transplanted, but have not
filled out an organ donor card, nor told their preferences to their
families, nor even thought very much about the issue. 8 There are
others who would donate if given accurate information designed to
reduce their misconceptions and fears. For example, according to a
survey by the Boston-based Partnership for Organ Donations, more
than half of the families that refused to donate the organs of a
deceased relative did not realize that their brain-dead relative was
actually dead. 9 Believing it possible to recover from brain death, it is
not surprising that families were reluctant to donate their loved ones'
bodies.
Public awareness efforts encounter relatively little political

56. For precedent on a hybrid priority-financial incentive program, see infra note
163. For precedent on a hybrid priority-presumed consent incentive program, see infra
note 144.
57. In 2001, Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson launched
the "Gift of Life" Donation Initiative to raise awareness of the organ scarcity problem.
HHS ProgramPushes for Increase in Organ Donations, THE NATION'S HEALTH, June
2001, at 5 (describing plans for a "national Workplace Partnership for Life campaign"
and for "donation education programs ... in drivers' education classes").
58. According to a 1993 Gallup poll, of those not likely to have their organs
donated, 47% explained their response with "No reason/don't know/haven't given much
thought," while only 5% gave religious reasons. THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC.,
supra note 6, at 5.
59. McMenamin, supra note 55, at 144.
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opposition." There is some evidence, however, that they have limited
effectiveness. For example, a British Department of Health television
campaign used intense publicity to reduce organ donation refusal
rates from 30% to 22%."' This is a significant, but hardly staggering,
improvement. Worse yet, when the publicity campaign ended, refusal
rates returned to their pre-campaign levels.62 Public awareness,
although the centerpiece of efforts to increase donation for many
years, has proved startlingly ineffective at increasing cadaveric organ
donation rates.
B.

Better Enforcement of Existing Laws

Under both the 1968 and 1987 versions of the UAGA, a signed
document of a gift by a donor cannot be vetoed later by families.63
Nevertheless, many medical professionals will not procure organs
from a potential donor when family members refuse to give their
(legally superfluous) consent, 4 even though medical personnel are
immune from liability when they have documentation of a donor's
gift. According to David Orentlicher, "[elven in cases in which a
person has completed an organ donor card, transplant surgeons
generally will not remove the person's organs without the family's
permission." 5 A recent survey of OPOs supports this belief. When
next of kin are opposed to donation, only 11.5% of OPOs are "Very
likely" or "pretty likely" to procure organs based on the deceased's
donor card or a comparable document. Put another way, your family
has more control over the disposition of your organs than you do,
even when you explicitly state a willingness to donate. This lack of
attention to donative intent explains why organ donation awareness
60. See, e.g., Susan J. Landers, Closing the Gap on Supply and Demand for Organ
Donation, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 12, 2001, at 1 (stating that after Health and Human
Services Secretary Tommy Thompson launched a donation awareness campaign,
"[p]hysicians and patient advocacy groups cheered Thompson's announcement" and
"[tihe AMA congratulated Thompson on his commitment").
61. Jennifer M. Krueger, Life Coming Bravely Out of Death: Organ Donation
Legislation Across European Countries, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 321, 337 (2000).
62. Id. Complicating assessments of donative intentions, social psychological
research has shown that there is a low correlation between people's expressed
attitudes toward donation on surveys (usually high because it is considered socially
desirable) and their actual willingness to donate. See Bahman Baluch et al., Signing
the Organ Donor Card: The Relationship Between Expressed Attitude, the Actual
Behavior, and Personality Traits, 141 J. SOC. PSYCH. 124, 126 (2001) ("The present
findings generally imply that expressed attitudes toward organ donation, as measured
by the Likert-type scale, cannot predict actual behavior.").
63. Sullivan, supra note 32, at 30.
64. See Wendler & Dickert, supra note 13, at 331.
65. David Orentlicher, Organ Donation-The Willing Donor, in ETHICS IN
EMERGENCY MEDICINE 214, 217 (Kenneth V. Iverson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
66. See Wendler & Dickert, supra note 13, at 331.
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campaigns emphasize the need to tell one's relatives about the
decision to donate. Referring to donation campaigns which emphasize
family discussion, Robert Sullivan writes:
That is all myth and misconception. It is not the law under
either the 1968 or the 1987 UAGA! ...It is a simple matter to
correct the message and to change the policy. No amendment of
the law, no new proposal to expand the procurement process is
required. It is only necessary to accept and follow the law as it
is-an unrevoked, signed donor card is a valid gift.67
Many would consider it even more disturbing that some OPOs
are willing to procure organs with family consent even when doing so
runs counter to the wishes expressed by the deceased on a donor
card.68 Recent survey results on donation consent practices published
in the Journalof the American Medical Association show that nearly
half of all OPOs are willing to "procure organs despite written
objection by the deceased," 9 thus offending "both the spirit and the
explicit commands of the UAGA."7 Describing the survey, Alexander
Capron writes that "data suggest that OPOs do not follow the law,
that their procurement practices vary one from another in
unpredictable ways, and that the justifications given by [OPOs] for
their practices bear little relationship to those practices." 1 Overall,
these survey findings "should be disconcerting to anyone concerned
with organ transplantation." 2 Proposals that encourage OPOs to
follow current laws are both desirable and politically feasible.
C. Improved Methods of Request
Given our actual organ procurement practices, it is clear that the
organ supply is highly dependent on requests made to families. Such
requests are made to families when they have recently lost a loved
one and must, while grieving, quickly decide whether or not to
donate. Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that less than half of all
families agree to donate.73 Research has shown that donation rates
can be increased by improving the ways in which health care
professionals approach families that are about to make donation
decisions.74 Such improvements represent relatively uncontroversial
67. Sullivan, supra note 32, at 31.
68. Such a practice is perhaps morally justifiable to the extent that it saves a life.
See infra text accompanying notes 118-26.
69. Capron, supra note 19, at 335.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Laura A. Siminoff & Kata Chillag, The Fallacy of the 'Gift of Life,' 29 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 34, 35 (1999).
74. One reason for this is that 55% of families say that they made their donation
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ways of increasing donation.
Families are more likely to donate if they have a good
relationship with the health care professional who cared for the
deceased patient,75 and if they are contacted as part of their decisionmaking process by people trained to make such requests." It helps if
organ procurement specialists actively try to dispel myths and
misconceptions about organ donation and address family concerns
about the effects of donation on funeral arrangements." Families are
also more likely to donate if they are told in advance that a request
will be made, presumably because this gives them a chance to
prepare emotionally for the decision."8 Not surprisingly, "asking
apologetically or mentioning that one is legally required to ask is
likely to result in a refusal." 9
D. Required Request
Before family members can accept or deny a request for
donation, they need to be asked. One reason that the organ supply is
lower than it should be is that medical personnel do not always ask
for donations from families of eligible donors. In 1985, Oregon passed
a statute requiringhospital personnel to seek organ donations from
surviving family members.8" Such "required request" statutes
typically mandate that hospital personnel ask families of eligible
donors to donate their loved ones' organs and that personnel certify
that the request was made in medical records and on death
certificates."
The UAGA of 1987 includes required request
provisions82 and within five years of the passage of the Oregon
statute, most states had adopted a similar rule.83
Compliance with required request laws, however, has been
somewhat disappointing. A 1995 study found that 13.5% of families
decision at the time of initial request. Laura A. Siminoff et al., Factors Influencing
Families' Consent for Donation of Solid Organs for Transplantation,286 J. AM. MED.
AsS'N 71, 72 (2001).
75. See id. at 76.
76. See id. (indicating that "involvement of the family with a professional from the
OPO is critical" and "[tihat the time spent with the OPO coordinator was a strong
factor associated with the decision to donate").
77. See id. at 77.
78. See id. at 76.
79. Id.
80. OR. REV. STAT. § 97.268 (1990) (repealed 1995).
81. See Sullivan, supra note 32, at 23.
82. Id. at 28.
83. Id. at 24; see also NAT'L ATTORNEYS' COMM. ON TRANSPLANT AWARENESS, INC.,
ORGAN

AND

TISSUE

DONATION AND

TRANSPLANTATION:

A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE,

http://www.transweb.org/reference/articles/donation/nacta.html (last visited Aug. 25,
2003) ("By 1988, 44 states had passed their own 'required request' legislation.").
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of eligible cadaveric donors were never even asked to make a
donation." While the United States is doing better than Canada,
where 25% of such families were never asked to donate, 5 there is still
substantial room to increase request rates.
On the other hand, it is possible that families which are not
approached for donation have been intentionally avoided because
medical professionals deem the family unlikely to donate.
Approaching those families may hardly increase donations at all.
This concern forms part of the opposition to required request laws,
where some have argued that they "impos[e] too great a burden on
physicians and families"'6 and do not increase donation. 7 It would,
therefore, be better to have a reliable, coordinated system of
recording donor intentions while donors are still competent to make
decisions.8 If such a system were widely utilized, families would not
be forced so frequently to make donation decisions for deceased
relatives.
E. Mandated Choice
Mandated choice programs would require competent adults to
decide whether or not they are willing to become organ donors. 9 Such
programs seek to relieve families of much of the burden of making
donation decisions and place it where it belongs--on future donors
who are still competent to make decisions. In its most extreme
version, one might be required to officially list oneself as a donor or a
non-donor much as young men are obligated to register for the
Selective Service.
Actual efforts to make people indicate donation preferences have
been much more tentative. For example, the UAGA of 1987 requires
hospitals to ask admitted patients if they want to donate their
organs. This does not force people to state their wishes, but it does
make them consider the issue and will probably get most people to
express some sort of preference. Unfortunately, such hospital
questionnaires will not reveal the intentions of some of the most
frequent organ donors, namely, those who die from injuries in
traumatic motor vehicle accidents and are usually incapable of
84. Siminoffet al., supra note 74, at 71.
85. Anita Dubey, Overcoming Barriersto Organ Donation: Strong Support Needed
for Successful Programs,Experts Say, WEBMD CAN. MED. NEWS, Apr. 24, 2001, at 1.
86. Sullivan, supra note 32, at 24.
87. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass'n, Strategies for
Cadaveric Organ Procurement, 272 J. AMER. MED. ASS'N 809, 810 (1994).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 145-48.
89. See generally VEATCH, supra note 23, at 175-81 (discussing the relative merits
of mandated choice).
90. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5 (1987).
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making donation decisions by the time they enter the hospital.
Unfortunately, without some non-altruistic incentive to donate,
mandated choice proposals may have the effect of reducing the organ
supply. Those forced to decide whether or not to donate may err on
the side of perceived caution and withhold consent. For example,
Texas instituted a program requesting all applicants for driver's
licenses to state their donation preferences. Early data from the
program suggested that the refusal rate was as high as 80%.91 While
waiting for a license at a motor vehicle office, one is usually not in
great spirits, and the setting is not conducive to making important
postmortem decisions. If people were instead approached under
better circumstances, a mandated choice program could go a long
way toward respecting the wishes of the deceased and reducing
stress on grieving families. It may not, however, do much, by itself, to
ameliorate the organ shortage.
F.

Presumed Consent

One way to almost certainly increase organ donation is to
establish a policy which presumes that people consent to donate
unless they have expressed contrary intentions. Thus, those who
wish not to become organ donors would have to "opt-out" by officially
registering opposition to donation, perhaps by telling their families
about their refusal to donate or by carrying a "non-donor card."
A policy of presumed consent is already part of our legal regime
in various respects. For example, to the extent that we allow family
donation decisions to represent the will of the deceased, we are
making a presumption about consent. In effect, we presume that
decedents grant their families authority to make donation decisions,
unless the decedent expresses his or her own donative intentions. 2
In addition, several states incorporate some kind of presumption
of consent into their organ donation regimes. Many states have laws
that give medical examiners the authority, during the course of
autopsies, to remove corneal tissue for donation without explicit

91. Laura A. Siminoff et al., Public Policy Governing Organ and Tissue
Procurement in the United States: Results from the National Organ and Tissue
ProcurementStudy, 123 ANN. INTERN. MED. 10, 16 (1995).
92. Whether this is actually a presumption of consent is debatable since the family
of the recently-deceased have "quasi-property" interests in the deceased's body. 22A
AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 3 (1988) (noting that these interests "may include rights to
possession and custody of the body for burial, to prevent the corpse from disturbances
after burial, or to remove it to a proper place") (citations omitted). Thus, from one
perspective, family organ donation decisions are exercises of familial property rights in
deceased bodies. The explanation for such familial property interests, however,
probably stems from the view that family preferences for the deceased provide our best
surrogate for what would have been the deceased's actual preferences.
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consent from anyone.93 State legislatures with such laws may have
reasoned that, since tissue is permanently removed during the
autopsy process anyhow and the removal of corneas can substantially
help living people without noticeably changing the appearance of a
dead body, the presumption in favor of consent is acceptable.94 In
State v. Powell,95 the Florida Supreme Court found such a statute
constitutional under state law because it promoted rational state
objectives and required "an infinitesimally small intrusion which
does not affect the decedent's appearance."96
Some states give medical examiners authority to remove more
than just corneas.97 A key difference between the 1968 UAGA and the
1987 UAGA is that the former required some form of explicit
authorization to use bodies and bodily organs98 while the latter
permits medical examiners to remove visceral bodily organs (like
hearts and lungs) when a "reasonable effort" is made to obtain
authorization, and there is no knowledge of objection from the
decedent or the decedent's family.9 However, medical examiners are
reluctant to use organs without family consent, even in states where
doing so is permitted. For example, in the first year after medical
examiners were given presumed consent authority in Texas, it was
only used twice. 00
Many commentators have sought to extend presumptions of
consent beyond the limited case of medical examiner autopsies, 9 ' and
some states have considered legislation to implement thoroughgoing
presumed consent policies,"' like those already in place in many
93. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4712 (2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.5185
(West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10202 (West 2001).
94. CURRAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 740.
95. 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).
96. Id. at 1191. But cf. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the wife of a decedent could raise a section 1983 claim for wrongful
removal of her husband's corneas after she expressed a contrary preference).
97. For more information, see generally the morbidly-titled piece, Erik S. Jaffe,
Note, "She's Got Bette Davis('s) Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of
Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528
(1990).
98. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 2, 4 (1968).
99. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (1987).
100. CURRAN ETAL.,supra note 14, at 751.
101. See, e.g., PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE 169-82 (1990); Theodore Silver,
The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68
B.U. L. REV. 681 (1988).
102. See Andis Robeznieks, Texas Mulls Policy for Organ Donation by Presumed
Consent, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 28, 2003, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/scipubs/amnews/pick_03/prscO428.htm; see also VEATCH, supra note 23, at 169
(describing proposed legislation in Maryland and Pennsylvania to implement
presumed consent on a statewide basis).
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other countries. For example, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
Slovenia all use presumed consent."°3 Typically; these countries
permit procurement of organs from any eligible cadaver so long as
the individual had not expressly declined consent while alive, unlike
the hybrid system in the U.S. of opt-in donation and familial
decision-making. Yet, even in countries with presumed consent, the
presumption is usually not strictly enforced, and doctors still seek to
discuss the matter with the families of the deceased."' This may
explain why donation rates under presumed consent regimes, though
substantially higher than those in the United States, are not
staggeringly better. Bioethicist Arthur Caplan estimates that
donation rates in countries with presumed consent "are about 15
percent higher than those of the best American organ procurement
organizations."10 5
In the U.S., there is substantial opposition to a presumption of
consent.' 6 It is a mistake, therefore, to presume consent in this
country if we take that presumption to actually reflect people's
preferences:
Social survey evidence makes clear that if we assume people
would agree to having their organs procured if they were asked,
we would be wrong something like 30-50 percent of the time. A
1993 Gallup polls show that only 37 percent of Americans are
"very likely" to want their organs transplanted after their
death, and only 32 percent are "somewhat likely." Furthermore,
only 55 percent are willing to grant formal permission for organ
removal.' 7
It is difficult to formulate exactly whose interests are harmed when
we procure organs from those who had preferred not to donate. Those
likely to be the primary complainants are deceased. However, if we
believe it possible to harm the interests of the deceased (or the
interests of their survivors), we will find a system of presumed
consent quite imperfect. While it might be better than our current
system, it is certainly worse than a system which similarly increases
organ donation without contravening our interests in bodily
autonomy.

103. EUROTRANSPLANT,
LEGISLATION,
at
http://www.eurotransplant.nl/
index.php?id= legislation (last visited Aug. 25, 2003).
104. Krueger, supra note 61, at 331.
105. Randi Hutter Epstein, How Diplomacy in Handling Death Can Save Lives,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2003, at F5.
106. VEATCH, supra note 23, at 170 (indicating "that only 38 percent of Americans
agree with presumed consent" and that "another survey shows that number to be only
7 percent").
107. Id. at 170 (citing data from THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 6, at
4, 15).
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G. FinancialIncentives
One way to encourage people to affirmatively agree to donate is
to offer them financial compensation. If appropriately designed, a
system of financial incentives can increase organ donation without
contravening respect for bodily autonomy. While many critics fear
that any such incentives will unacceptably commercialize human
body parts, most of us are unfazed by the behind-the-scenes
commerce in human organs and tissue that goes on everyday." °8 For
example, donation of bone, tendon, and skin from a single donor can
generate as much as $70,000 in services fees,' °9 none of which goes to
the donor or the donor's family. The real issue, some argue, is who
should be compensated when organs and tissue are transplanted and
not whether there should be compensation at all. As Julia Mahoney
forcefully states:
[M]oney changes hands at numerous points in the chain of
distribution from tissue source to ultimate consumer:
Transplant patients pay to receive organs, fertility patients
purchase ova and sperm, and biotechnology firms sell products
derived from human cells. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to
imagine how human biological materials would be distributed if
commerce in such materials were prohibited ....
As now
conducted, then, the debate over the commercialization of the
human body is not about commercialization at all, but rather
about how the financial benefits available will be apportioned."0
Though one can argue that organ transplant patients pay only for
transplant services and not for the organs themselves, this argument
"is no more persuasive than contending that restaurants sell not
food, but only 'dining services."""
A wide variety of proposals have been offered to apportion some
of the financial benefits from trade in organs and tissue to the
individuals and families that supply the essential materials. Some
have proposed financial compensation for families of organ donors
through either payment of funeral expenses"' or reductions in federal
income tax."3 These are the sorts of proposals that the AMA thinks
108. Naomi Freundlich, All of Me, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2003, at 94 ("The total
trade in human tissue transplants is hard to pin down, but estimates are as high as $1
billion.").
109. Id.
110. Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 165
(2000) (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 182.
112. See, e.g., Fred Charatan, Pennsylvania Plans to Reward Organ Donation, 318
BRIT. MED. J. 1371 (1999).
113. See, e.g., James V. Hanson & Felicia Cohn, Putting a Price on Organ
Donations, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at F6.
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are most in need of further research. However, they are probably the
least desirable. By compensating surviving family members, we give
them an incentive to contravene the wishes of the deceased.
Furthermore, we reward them for offering up their relative's organs,
though it is by no means clear that the actual sacrifice is made by
survivors.114 Other contemplated financial incentive schemes would
compensate those who commit to donate while they are still alive
should they die with organs eligible for transplantation." 5
Each proposed financial incentive scheme needs to be evaluated
independently, and the AMA should be praised for boldly
encouraging this path of exploration. Yet, it would be a mistake to
consider financial incentives and not priority incentives. If nothing
else, financial incentive plans are likely to face substantial, perhaps
insurmountable political opposition. The NOTA of 1984 made it
illegal to "knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce,""' though
the statute permits reasonable payments to hospitals and physicians
as compensation for their professional services." 7 Given the
entrenchment of anti-compensation policies in organ donation law,
financial incentive programs, while certainly worth considering, face
serious uphill battles. I return to discuss, and in many ways defend,
financial incentive schemes in Part V.
H.

Routine Salvage

I save for last a somewhat more detailed discussion of one of the
most dramatic and effective means of increasing the organ supply. It
can best be understood by first examining some of the ethical issues
underlying organ donation.
A familiar tool of bioethical inquiry has us imagine an out-of-

114. Instructive in this regard is a story from transplant surgeon Thomas G. Peters.
Upon requesting consent to procure organs from the older brother of a recently
deceased patient, the brother replied, "I hated that s.o.b.! Go ahead and cut him...
take his organs! Where do I sign?" Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of
Payment in Cadaveric Organ Donation, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 196,
198 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998).
115. On the variety of ways to structure financial incentives, see Lloyd R. Cohen,
Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a FuturesMarket, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (1989); Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the
Creationof a FuturesMarket in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 29-37 (1994).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000).
117. Id. § 274e(c)(2). Prohibited payments do "not include the reasonable payments
associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation,
quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing and
lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with donation of the
organ." Id.
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control trolley speeding toward some person tied to its tracks. We can
flip a switch in order to divert the trolley to a second track, but doing
so will unfortunately cause the trolley to hit some other person or
group of people. These "trolley problems" test our intuitions about
the kinds of actions we are morally permitted to take to achieve
certain outcomes.11 I will offer some trolley problems that are much
more straightforward than those typically posed.
The Unknown Corpse
Suppose an out-of-control trolley is speeding toward a person
tied to the trolley tracks. One can divert the trolley to another
track, thus saving the person's life, but hitting an already dead
body lying for some reason on the second track. The impact
with the trolley will unaesthetically crush the corpse. Given
these circumstances, is it permissible to divert the train toward
the corpse?
We are asked to choose between saving a human life and
crushing a deceased one. Unpleasant as the choice may be, the
solution is obvious. Clearly, we may save a human life by allowing a
trolley to run over a dead body. Our intuition likely goes further to
say that it would be immoral not to divert the train, since it is
morally blameworthy to be capable of saving a living human being
but to choose instead to spare a lifeless corpse. Thus, a principle
underlying this trolley problem is that some sort of desecration,
trespass, or invasion of a dead body is permitted (and perhaps
morally required) in order to save a life.
Now, however, let us make the trolley problem slightly harder:
The Spiritual Corpse
Suppose once again that a trolley is going to hit a living person
unless it is diverted toward a body lying dead on its tracks. This
time, however, you are aware that when the dead person was
alive, he filled out a form emphatically stating his wish to be
buried intact, declaring a religious objection to any form of
bodily desecration. Furthermore, relatives of the deceased are
standing nearby telling you not to damage their loved one's
body. If the trolley runs over the dead body, it will, of course,
crush it.
Now that you know something about the dead body, it makes
118. For a collection of essays with extensive discussion of trolley problems, see
generally KILLING AND LETTING DIE (Bonnie Steinbock & Alastair Norcross eds., 2d.
ed. 1994).
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your choice slightly more difficult. You must choose between saving a
human life and overriding both the expressed preferences of a
deceased person and the expressed preferences of his relatives. Does
the new information change your decision to divert the track? Not at
all. Surely it would still be permissible to divert the trolley and may
even be morally obligatory. When the trolley hits the dead body, it
will violently crush it and create an unpleasant mess; it will also
upset the surviving relatives of the deceased. But, this seems like a
small price to pay to save a life.
There is a not-so-subtle analogy between these trolley problems
and cadaveric organ donation. In the trolley problems, a living person
watches as the trolley ominously speeds toward him, just as those
waiting to receive an organ watch their serious, usually lifethreatening diseases grow progressively more deadly. We can save a
life in the trolley problem by taking an action which violates the
integrity of a dead body, much as the lives of organ recipients can be
saved by procuring organs from a dead person who was unwilling to
donate. In the trolley problems, we thought it morally permissible to
desecrate a dead body even when consent to desecrate is specifically
and intentionally withheld. If we think organ donation is sufficiently
analogous, then it seems morally permissible to transplant organs
from a dead body, even without consent from the deceased or the
deceased's family.
The trolley problem is not perfectly analogous to organ donation.
When we look more carefully at the considerations underlying the
analogy, however, the merits of organ donation seem even more
manifest than the merits of trolley diversion. First, bodies used in
organ donation typically save not one life but several, since each
donor body has the potential to save six or more lives." 9 So, if the
numbers count, the gains to be had from donating the organs of one
person are more than the gains to be had from diverting the trolley.
Second, the costs to the deceased (to the extent that we recognize
such costs at all) and his or her family are much smaller in the case
of organ donation than in the case of trolley diversion. When a
cadaver is used for organ donation, the body is not nearly as
damaged as it would be if run over by a trolley. Cadavers that have
had organs removed can still be used in open casket funerals and will
not likely look any different than they would have had they not been

119. Richard Perez-Pena, Downside to Fewer Violent Deaths: Transplant Organ
Shortage Grows, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 2003, at B1 (stating that a healthy young donor
"is likely to have a usable heart, pancreas, liver, two kidneys, two lungs and
intestines.., enough to save a half-dozen or more lives in some cases"); cf. Bucklin,
supra note 17, at 324 (stating that 3.37 organs are recovered on average per cadaveric
donor).
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used for organ donation at all.12°
Perhaps, then, the difference between organ donation and our
trolley problems is that, in organ donation, body parts are intended
to be used by others, while in our trolley problems, the desecration of
a body was just an unfortunate, though foreseen, consequence of our
"
' The so-called "doctrine of double effect" attempts
need to save a life.12
to highlight the moral difference "between what a man foresees as a
result of his voluntary action and what, in the strict sense, he
intends."'22 But this distinction will not take us very far, as
demonstrated by this grisly example:
The Corpse as Object
It is wartime and doctors are tending to patients near enemy
lines. Army doctors are performing open heart surgery on a
soldier with a bullet wound. During the surgery, the patient
dies and resuscitation efforts prove fruitless. Just after the
head surgeon gives up and declares the soldier dead, a ferocious
dog, perhaps trained by enemy forces, enters the surgery area
and attacks one of the doctors. Others in the room struggle to
remove the hungry dog but to little avail. To save the life of the
doctor being attacked, one of the other doctors pulls out the
heart of the dead soldier and throws it at the dog in order to
offer it some other source of food. Miraculously, the plan works
and all escape while the dog is temporarily distracted by the
unusual piece of flesh.
In this example, the use of an organ is not merely the foreseeable
consequence of an attempt to save a life. In order to work, the doctor
intended that the organ would be used to distract the dog. In our
prior examples, we would be quite happy if the dead body on the
diversion track simply disappeared or was never on the tracks in the
first place. Desecration of a dead body in those examples was a
foreseeable but unintended consequence of trolley diversion. But in

120. CAL. TRANSPLANT DONOR NETWORK, RESOURCES & INFORMATION: FAQS, at
http://www.ctdn.org/resources/faqs.php (last visited Aug. 25, 2003) ("The retrieval of
organs is conducted like any other surgical procedure. In no way will organ donation
interfere with an open casket funeral and families can proceed with the memorial
service they have planned in a prompt manner.").
121. A similar but slightly different objection is that in organ donation, unlike the
trolley problem, one's organs are actually used by someone else. While most of us view
the use of our organs to save another's life as a good thing, some might object on
religious or aesthetic grounds to the idea that one's body parts are placed inside
another to serve some function that is not our own.
122. Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, in
KILLING AND LETTING DIE 266, 267 (Bonnie Steinbock & Alastair Norcross eds., 2d ed.
1994).
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this example, the use of the dead body and its organs was essential.
Some kind of organ or other flesh had to be used in order to
accomplish the intended result. Nevertheless, the use was morally
permissible. You may desecrate a dead body, and even use its organs,
regardless of the deceased's preferences, in order to save a life.
Perhaps more astounding is that this intuition survived in this
example, even though the doctor's action had but a small chance of
working. Imagine how much more agreeably we would look upon
lifesaving actions with higher probabilities of success.
Does it matter that we can see the victim in the trolley problems
and in the attack dog example but cannot see the lives lost in the
organ donation context when eligible cadavers are destroyed? It is
hard to see how this could make a moral difference. Furthermore, we
could easily arrange a trolley problem where the living person is
unknown to us and is remote in time or place. Yet our intuition
would remain that saving the life of an unknown person trumps the
rights of the dead, including the right to bodily autonomy as
expressed before death.
If we really accepted the analogy between these examples and
organ donation, we could institute a policy where all bodies that are
eligible to donate organs are used for donation regardless of anyone's
donation preferences. Such a policy, sometimes called "routine
salvage," would seek to transplant every medically eligible organ and
would thereby maximize lives saved from organ donation. Under a
system of routine salvage, organs are not the property of any person
but are a shared common resource. In dicta in Moore v.Regents of the
University of California,"3 the Supreme Court of California seemed to
characterize the organ donation system exactly as a pooled resource:
It is certainly arguable that, as a matter of policy or morality, it
would be wiser to prohibit any private individual or entity from
profiting from the fortuitous value that adheres in a part of a
human body, and instead to require all valuable excised body
parts to be deposited in a public repository which would make
such materials freely available to all scientists for the
betterment of society as a whole. The Legislature, if it wished,
could create such a system, as it has done with respect to
organs that are donated for transplantation. 24'
Nevertheless, a routine salvage system would come at a
substantial cost to the principle that the human body should
ordinarily not be violated by the state without consent. This principle
has been expressed by courts, at least in the context of live organ

123.
124.

51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990).
Id. at 159.
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donation. In McFall v. Shimp,"2 ' a Pennsylvania judge wrote: "For a
society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth
into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it
sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought
concepts of jurisprudence."126
However, while it is a worthy goal to procure all useable organs,
we could imagine a still-better solution in which everybody (or almost
everybody) was willing to donate organs. This would maximize
organs available for donation without having to frustrate the
preferences of the deceased and their living relatives. So, while it
might be morally permissible to send the trolley toward the body of
the person who withheld consent, it would be still better to give some
incentive to that person during his life to convince him to consent to
bodily desecration when needed to save a life. Thus, we could both
save a life and not violate anyone's preferences. To the extent that an
incentive proposal can achieve nearly maximum levels of donor
registration, then it will have most of the advantages of routine
salvage without the disadvantages. At a minimum, we should try less
extreme incentive programs first to determine if they can fill at least
a substantial part of the supply gap.
IV. A PRIORITY

INCENTIVE PROPOSAL

In this part, I sketch a proposal whereby adults who register to
donate are given some priority to receive an organ should they
someday need one. Priority incentives could be instituted either
through our current government-sponsored organ distribution
networks or through the creative efforts of private, social
entrepreneurs who seek to demonstrate the benefits of priority
incentives and convince policymakers that such a system can work.
While there are many reasons to support priority allocation, the
most important reason is that doing so will increase the number of
organs donated and the number of lives saved through
transplantation. I take no strong position as to how much priority
should be given to registered donors. I suggest, however, that priority
could be calculated so that even those who do not register as organ
donors are no worse off under a priority system than under our
current allocation scheme.

125. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County 1978). In this case, Robert McFall was
suffering from a rare bone marrow disease and was desperately in need of a transplant
from the only suitable donor, his first cousin, David Shimp. Id. at 90. McFall
unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction to compel Shimp to undergo further
tests associated with the transplant. Id. at 92.
126. Id.
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A.

PriorityIncentives Will Increase Organ Supply

The principal reason to institute a priority allocation scheme is
purely instrumental-doing so will increase the organs available to
all. The altruistic motivation to donate has proven itself woefully
insufficient, and while many preach that it should be sufficient,
people on organ waiting lists are dying at an average rate of sixteen
per day in the United States.'27
Many people are ambivalent about donating and could be
convinced to donate with just a small incentive to help them
overcome the inertia which protects us from mulling over our own
mortality. Though we need more empirical research, it is quite likely
that if registered donors were granted priority to receive organs, we
would sway many more people into the willing-donor category.128
The benefits of registering under a priority incentive program
clearly exceed the costs. Even after registering, it is extremely
unlikely that a registrant will donate organs because it is rare to die
with organs medically eligible for transplantation. We have far more
organ recipients than donors because each body used in
transplantation provides organs to several individuals. 9 Under a
priority scheme, potential donors can make the trade off between the
very remote possibility of becoming an organ donor and the not-quiteso remote possibility of needing an organ. Understandably, neither
the role of donor nor recipient is particularly appealing to think
about. If you are in the latter category, your life is threatened, and if
you are in the former category your life is over. But, under a priority
system, you have an incentive to register because you are more likely
to be rewarded by the system than made to contribute to it.
More importantly, the actual rewards of registering under a
priority scheme (and thereby increasing one's life expectancy) far
outstrip the costs, if any, of having some organs removed after death.
Despite the discomfort one may have about registering to donate, an
actual donation will only be made when one is dead and unaware,
while the process of needing an organ occurs only while one is alive
and usually very much aware.
127. Japsen, supra note 4 (noting that "[n]early 6,000 Americans-an average of 16
a day-die each year").
128. There is some evidence that donors are better motivated by self-interest than
altruism. For example, a study on the effectiveness of two different kinds of organ
donor public service announcements found that those emphasizing benefits to the
registrant were more effective in increasing willingness to donate than were
announcements emphasizing benefits to future organ recipients. See Barbara E. Nolan
& Patrick J. McGrath, Social Cognitive Influences on the Willingness to Donate
Organs,

in

ORGAN
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AND

TRANSPLANTATION:

PSYCHOLOGICAL

AND

BEHAVIORAL FACTORS 25, 25 (James Shanteau & Richard Jackson Harris eds., 1990).
129. See supra note 119.
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The importance of increasing organ supply can hardly be
overstated. Doing so will save lives by making more organs available.
Those who receive priority are helped for obvious reasons. And,
depending on the extent of the priority involved, it can help those
who do not receive priority if donations induced by a priority system
sufficiently increase organ supply to offset their reduced priority. An
increased organ supply will also improve the quality of life of those
who need an organ, not necessarily to live, but to live free of
debilitation. Most notably, this group includes many of those who
spend hours each week undergoing the ordeal of kidney dialysis.'3 °
Lastly, increasing the supply of cadaveric organs will reduce pressure
on living people to donate kidneys or parts of other organs to their
relatives or friends on waiting lists, in operations that can generate
significant health risks to donors and the potential for deep
intrafamilial strife.'
B. PriorityIncentives Are Not "Valuable Consideration"
NOTA, which makes it illegal to "knowingly acquire, receive, or
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration," 32
poses a significant obstacle to the creation of financial incentive
schemes, like those that the American Medical Association seems to
think most worthy of study.'33 In contrast, NOTA should not pose a
legal obstacle to the creation of priority incentives.
Under a priority incentive system, registered donors do get
something of value. However, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
it is unlikely that priority organ receipt is the kind of "valuable
consideration" that would violate NOTA. Congress passed NOTA as a
not to gain priority
response to efforts to purchase organs'

130. See MacDonald, supra note 25, at 177. The author quotes the following
testimonial from a a dialysis patient:
[The dialysis] machine takes the place of my irresponsible kidneys .... Once
everything is connected, the tubing that I'm tethered to allows me to walk
about 10 feet in any direction. I can go to the bathroom and wash my hands,
but if I'm cold I can't reach the bathroom windows. I can go to the
refrigerator for something to eat or drink, but I can't reach the stove. I feel
like a dog on a short leash, confined to the backyard .... Peritoneal dialysis
is a rather long process. It takes about twelve hours to complete the
treatment. I spend half of a twenty-four hour day connected to a machine.
Day after day, each and every day.
Id. (alteration in original). There is also evidence that suicide rates are much higher
among dialysis patients. See Cohen, supra note 115, at 38 n.ll0.
131. See supra notes 21, 26. Also, at about $500,000, live liver transplants can cost
twice as much as cadaveric liver transplants. Carmichael, supra.note 21, at 53.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000).
133. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
134. ANDREW KIMBRELL, THE HUMAN BODY SHOP 30 (1993) (describing the economic
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allocation. For example, the title of the relevant section of NOTA is
"Prohibitions of organ purchases," suggesting that Congress was
focusing on monetary transactions. 13' Thus, it was probably not the
intent of Congress to preclude priority incentives.
Even without reference to congressional intent, however, one can
argue that registration in a priority incentive scheme is not the
knowing transfer of "any human organ" for valuable consideration.
First, at no point in time is a human organ ever actually exchanged
or promised to be exchanged for something of value. At the time of
registration, participants are submitting to the mere possibility of
transferring an organ. Then, at the time that organs are actually
transferred under a priority allocation, the transferor has died and
cannot then be receiving consideration for his organ because
cadavers do not value anything. Second, if "consideration" is
understood according to its typical meaning in the law of contracts,
priority incentives do not involve an exchange for consideration,
because those who register can unilaterally change their minds until
death." 6 Thus, it is unclear if registrants in a priority incentive
scheme have made any legally enforceable agreement at all.137
Furthermore, the position of the organ donation community
seems to be that priority incentives would not violate NOTA. For
example, an UNOS ethics committee has taken the position that
priority incentives could be implemented without changing existing
legislation.138 In addition, incentives for live organ donation that are
structurally analogous to priority incentives have not been said to
violate NOTA. For example, a UNOS-approved program called "Hope
Through Sharing" is designed to help a person who would like to
donate a kidney to a relative in need but cannot because of organ
incompatibility. 39 Such a person can instead donate a kidney to a
concerns which prompted the legislation). See S. REP. No. 98-382, at 2, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975 (stating the intent of NOTA to "make the buying and selling
of human organs unlawful").
135. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000).
136. Registrants in a priority program give up no legal rights and suffer no legal
detriment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) ("To constitute
consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.... A
performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in
exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.").
137. The difficulty in crafting a legally enforceable agreement to create priority
incentives is but one of many advantages of having a national priority incentive
scheme rather than a series of private agreements created by contract. See infra text
accompanying notes 163-88.
138. UNOS ETHICS COMMITTEE, supra note 5 (stating that a "trial" of priority
incentives "could be implemented without requiring any alteration in existing
legislation, unlike other mechanisms under discussion").
139. Jay Lindsay, Kidney Donors Can Indirectly Aid Kin, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 2001,
at 21.
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non-relative on the waiting list who is a better match. In exchange,
the donor's relative is granted higher priority on the waiting list for a
cadaveric organ. 4 ° In effect, donors in this program exchange organs
for something valuable-namely, priority for their relatives." Since
this program is widely believed to comply with NOTA, it seems that
priority incentives should be similarly viewed. 4 '
C. A Government-SponsoredApproach
In any event, should a priority incentive program be created at
the national level, the federal government can amend NOTA to
clarify the valuable consideration language, even if such a
clarification is unnecessary. Alternatively, if priority incentives were
created through administrative regulation, the Department of Health
and Human Services' interpretation of NOTA would be given
substantial deference.14 A uniform national priority incentive scheme
would have the greatest credibility and legitimacy and would be the
easiest to advertise widely across the nation. 44
140. Id.
141. Press Release, Tufts-New England Medical Center, Tufts-New England
Medical Center Unveils First-in-Nation Transplant Exchange Program (Apr. 11, 2001),
available at http://www.nemc.org/home/news/pressrel/2001/01041101.htm ("Although
transplants are expedited, the new UNOS-approved system does not supercede
transplants to patients with medical emergencies or those with special matching
considerations, including individuals needing multiple organs .... These situations
account for only about 2 percent of the cases.").
142. General Counsel for UNOS has issued a legal opinion arguing that such
programs do not violate NOTA's valuable consideration provisions. See Williams
Mullen, Intended Recipient Exchanges, Paired Exchanges and NOTA § 301,
http://www.unos.org/shareddownloadables/301-nota.pdf (Mar. 7, 2003). Moreover, as
discussed, UNOS has its own policy of giving priority to live kidney donors who
subsequently need a transplant. See supra note 22.
143. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(deferring to the Environmental Protection Agency's reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statute); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1998 DUKE L.J. 511 (1998) (discussing the implications of
Chevron).
144. In 1987, Singapore enacted the Human Organ Transplant Act (HOTA) which
both presumes consent and offers priority incentives to deter opt-outs. See HUMAN
ORGAN TRANSPLANT ACT (1987), available at http://www.lawnet.com.sg/freeaccess/
HOTA.htm; Bernard Teo, Organs for Transplantation: The Singapore Experience,
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 10, 10-13 (Nov.-Dec. 1991). HOTA presumes the willingness to
donate kidneys of mentally competent non-Muslim Singaporeans between ages 21 and
60 who die in accidents. HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANT ACT § 5(2). HOTA also uses
priority incentives to discourage opting-out. Those who opt-out and those who are
presumed to opt-out (namely, Muslims who have not opted-in) have reduced priority
should they need kidney transplants. Id. §12(1)(a) (providing that "a person who has
not registered any objection ... shall have priority over a person who has registered
such objection").
The scope of Singapore's program is quite small. During the six-year period from
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Here are some high level steps, not necessarily in chronological
order, that would help establish a pribrity incentive program in the
United States:
1.

Establish National Donor Registry

An organ donor registry records an individual's willingness or
unwillingness to donate organs and other tissue at death. Twenty
states already have donor registries, and proposed legislation will
likely increase that number.14 ' A donor registry of some sort is
essential to the creation of a priority incentive scheme, as it allows
people to record their donation preferences and make themselves
eligible for priority allocation. It is not essential for a priority
incentive program that we have a truly national donor registry run
by the federal government, but we would need a registry that is
national in scope. This could potentially include a highly-linked set of
state registries, provided that registration is available to everyone.
Even under our current system of allocation, a national donor
registry would reduce the stressful decisions made by grieving
relatives, save precious time in transplanting organs from donors to
recipients, and otherwise facilitate and perhaps increase organ
donation. 46 For example, if a potential donor body enters a hospital
without a donor card or advance directive, the hospital can use other
forms of identification to consult a registry and determine the
deceased's donation preferences. A further advantage of a donor
registry relates to the fears some have that their organs will be
prematurely procured from their still-living bodies when medical
professionals learn that they are carrying an organ donor card. While
this fear is unfounded, 7 it may serve to reduce donor registration.
By establishing a confidential registry, we can require that a person
be declared dead before his status as an organ donor is revealed to
medical professionals.148 Thus, by promoting confidence in the organ
donation system and by helping to respect the wishes of the recently
deceased, donor registries should be supported both by those who are
1996 to 2001, on average, fewer than fourteen cadaveric kidney transplants involved
organs procured under HOTA. Singapore Ministry of Health, Proposed Amendments to
the Human Organ Transplant Act, Public Consultation Paper, available at
http://app.moh.gov.sg/our/our030202.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2003). However,
Singapore is considering expanding HOTA to include livers and corneas and to permit
organ procurement from those who die under a wider variety of circumstances. Id.
145. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS., supra note 11, at iii.
146. See, e.g., Wendler & Dickert, supra note 13, at 333 (reporting survey data on
OPO procurement consent practices which "provide some support for efforts to create a
national computerized registry of individuals' donation wishes").
147. Peters, supra note 5, at 179.
148. Id. (advocating a donor registry that "can be tapped only by authorized medical
personnel after the person has been declared brain dead").
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willing to donate and those who want to make it clear that they are
not.
149
Unlike donor registration under a mandated choice program,
however, those who register under a priority allocation system will
have a clear incentive to register as donors-namely, to gain priority
access to the organ supply. Such donors would be permitted to
change their preferences, and their corresponding priority to receive
organs, at any time before death. As a practical matter, a registry is
needed under a priority incentive program to avoid adverse selection
of donors in the pool of priority recipients. Without a registry, anyone
who developed a need for an organ could immediately declare a
willingness to donate and thereby claim priority access. Everyone on
a waiting list would lay claim to priority, thereby eliminating the
effect of the priority on allocation. Furthermore, the registration of
those on organ waiting lists will do little to increase the supply of
lifesaving organs, since those on organ waiting lists are suffering
from serious health problems that typically make their organs
ineligible for cadaveric donation. We cannot induce organ supply by
encouraging those in need of organs to list themselves as donors.
Therefore, eligibility for priority allocation requires more than just
having recently declared a willingness to donate.
One way to sidestep this problem is to limit the preference to
those who are eligible to donate at the time they enter the registry,
as determined by a medical examination."' A far better and more
politically appealing approach would simply require people to
register an intent to donate by a certain age, say eighteen."' If people
register by eighteen, regardless of their health status or eligibility to
donate, they will be eligible for preference. After this "freebie"
registration, they can register at any time (even if a medical
condition later makes them ineligible to donate), but they must wait
some period of time, perhaps a couple of years depending on the
organ, in order to be eligible for priority for that organ. This means
that one cannot develop a need for an organ, switch one's donation
preference, and then immediately get priority. Rather, some period of

149. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
150. This would exclude people who actively need organs (and are thereby usually
ineligible to donate) from receiving priority unless they announced their willingness to
donate before their ineligibility was discovered. Such a policy would also exclude many
of those who were born, for example, with hepatitis B, HIV, or other diseases that
typically make them poor sources of donor organs. Such an approach is unnecessarily
exclusive and stigmatizing for a government-sponsored program.
151. I do not address the difficult question of whether children should participate in
a priority allocation system. Perhaps we would allow them to participate based on
registration decisions made by their parents.
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time must pass while one is a registered donor without priority.' '2
The registry can also accommodate those who, for whatever
reason, would like to register to donate but would prefer not to
participate in the priority allocation system, as there is no reason to
alienate any potential donors. The registry could give such donors an
option to declare that they are willing to donate but do not wish to
receive priority should they ever need it. They may also declare that
their organs, should they ever be needed, ought not be allocated
according to a formula which provides for priority allocation. Thus,
those who cling to the alleged altruism under the status quo system
of allocation can turn down a donation incentive, making their gift of
life all the more altruistic.
2.

Promote Awareness of Registry and Priority Allocation

In conjunction with the creation of a registry that is national in
scope, efforts must be made to advertise the registry and to make
people aware that registered donors get slightly higher preference
than those who fail to register or register as unwilling to donate. It
would be unfortunate for one person to receive less priority than
someone else simply because education efforts reached the second
person and not the first. On the other hand, to the extent that the
priority program induces donation enough to offset the detriment of
having lower priority, then even an uninformed person who is not
registered but was willing to donate will still have benefited, with
respect to the person's life expectancy, from the existence of the
priority program. From a cost perspective, it would also be much
easier to educate people about donation in the context of a priority
program than it is to educate them now. With a priority program in
place, people suddenly have an incentive to pay attention since the
decision to register can now improve one's life expectancy. News
media that perpetually address our fears of death and illness will
offer free coverage explaining, albeit at some level of generality, that
registered organ donors have priority in receiving organs and that
"you, too, can have that priority by following these simple steps to
register."
3.

Respect Premortem Donation Decisions

To make a priority incentive system workable, premortem
decisions to donate must be respected. We cannot grant priority to a
152. For simplicity, when I refer to registered donors, I will assume that they are
registered donors with priority. An issue related to this waiting period concerns the
initial implementation of the program. It might be best to announce the
commencement of the priority allocation a couple of years in advance. This would
provide time to educate the public and allow people to register before organs are
actually distributed according to a priority formula.
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registered donor if the effect of that registration can later be trumped
by dissenting relatives. Similarly, if we want a donor registry which
is meaningful and trustworthy, we must also respect premortem
decisions not to donate.
The current failure to consistently respect premortem donation
preferences may stem from the absence of a party to defend the
decedent's autonomy interest. When the process fails, the decedent is
obviously in no position to sue, and those who would ordinarily sue
on his behalf, his family, are the ones who ultimately made the
decision either to consent or to refuse to donate. It is likely that some
regulatory solution may be necessary, as others may have difficulty
establishing standing to sue.'53 For example, state legislatures could
grant organ donation organizations the right to sue on behalf of
decedents whose clearly expressed donation preferences were
ignored.
4.

Allocate Some Priority to Registered Donors

The key step in the process, of course, is to alter allocation
formulas to give some priority to those patients on waiting lists who
have made a prior commitment to donate. The amount of priority to
assign will fall somewhere along a spectrum. At one extreme, the
needs of anyone who registered to donate could trump the needs of
anyone who did not, so that those who do not register are ineligible to
receive an organ until every registered donor in need of that organ
has received a successful transplant. At the other extreme, status as
a registered donor could be the absolute last tiebreaker between two
recipients who are otherwise equally eligible for an available organ.
While the first approach is unnecessarily draconian and pays too
little attention to the severity of a patient's need for an organ, the
second approach is too impotent, since the current allocation system
is sufficiently discriminating that true ties will rarely occur.
In between, there are virtually limitless formulas to allocate
priority. There is, however, a guiding principle we might use to
constrain these options. We might require any proposal to assign
priority to be such that the distribution under the proposal is
expected to be pareto superior to the one we have now."' If a proposal
153. Under federal law (and often under similar state laws), judicial power is
limited to "Cases" and "Controversies." See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This
provision has been interpreted to require a litigant to have personally suffered an
injury in order to bring suit for redress and limits the ability of concerned individuals
to sue for injuries to others. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-14 (2d ed. 1988).
154. Distribution A is pareto superior to Distribution B if there is at least one
person who is better off and no person who is worse off with Distribution A rather than
Distribution B. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 13 (4th ed. 1992).
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satisfies this condition, it means that as a result of the assignment of
priority, someone's chances of getting an organ will improve without
making anyone else's chances worse. If such a proposal were
implemented, it would reduce the concern that a priority incentive
scheme will harm those who are simply unaware of the priority
program or feel that they were not given sufficient opportunities to
register, since they will still share in the priority scheme's benefits,
albeit less than if they had registered to donate.
Here is how it could work: We expect that upon creating a
priority system, we will induce a certain amount of registration
leading to a certain increase in the supply of organs available for
donation. Assuming we can estimate this induced supply, we can
distribute it so that even those without priority have, on average, a
shorter expected waiting time than they had under the old system.
In this way, we can reduce everyone's average expected waiting time
(the measure by which most patients likely understand their
predicaments). If we think a priority incentive will induce only a
small supply increase, then we can give registered donors only a
small amount of priority. If we think that priority incentives will
induce a large increase in supply, we can make the priority incentive
larger.
This approach can be easily illustrated by making some
simplifying assumptions. Suppose that we have 100 people in need of
a liver and expect that one liver can be made available to this group
at the end of each month. It would take 100 months before every
person in the group received
a transplant,
assuming,
counterfactually, that no one dies during this period or receives a live
donor transplant or otherwise leaves the pool. We begin by ranking
those in the group according to our current allocative criteria.
Whatever the result, we can make some generalizations about
average expected waiting times. The average expected waiting time
for everyone in the group is fifty months (because organs are
available at a constant rate and fifty months bisects the total 100
month time period).
If, after we introduce priority, the average expected waiting time
for each person in this group is less than fifty months, we have
succeeded in creating a pareto superior organ distribution. To see
this, suppose that we consider this same group, but instead of using
current allocative criteria, we modify the criteria somewhat to reflect
a priority allocation. We will assume that in this world of
incentivized donation, we can supply 100 organs in just eighty
months instead of 100 months, due to induced donations from the
priority incentive scheme. At this point, the average expected waiting
time (prior to assigning priority) will drop to forty months (which
bisects the total time of 80 months). However, to reward the
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commitment to donate made by some of those in the pool, we set the
priority of registered donors such that they have a shorter waiting
time than those without priority. We could do this by imagining the
group split into two equally sized subgroups, one of which has
priority and one of which does not. For the subgroup with priority, we
shorten the average expected waiting time to, say, thirty-five months
and make the average expected waiting time forty-five months for
the others. Still, everyone benefits from the incentive program,
because each subgroup has an average expected waiting time that is
less than the fifty months it would have had under the old system. So
in this example, registered donors have shortened their waiting time
by over a year, and those not registered to donate have shortened
their waiting time by five months.
Example of a ParetoSuperiorDistribution Upon InstitutingPriority
Allocation
Category of Patient

Average Expected
Waiting Time

All Patients Under Current System
Registered
Donors
Under
Priority
System
Non-Registered Donors Under Priority
System

50 months
35 months
45 months

As a practical matter, it would be quite complicated to guarantee
a pareto superior distribution under a priority scheme. First, it will
be difficult to estimate the induced supply caused by the incentive.
Second, the amount of the induced supply will vary to some extent
with the amount of priority given. For those on the border between
donating and not donating, the amount of priority that donors
actually receive may affect their decision to participate. Public health
experts and statisticians would be left with the daunting task of
calculating the amount of priority to give based on an estimate of
induced donations where the level of induced donations depends on
the amount of priority given. Third, it would be difficult to determine
the size of the groupings at which to apply the pareto principle in
estimating patients' average expected waiting times. If categories
were very specific-for example, severely ill liver patients in a
particular locality with a particular blood and tissue type-small
sample sizes would make it difficult to develop accurate estimates.
On the other hand, if categories were very large, it would be difficult
to guarantee that everyone's average expected waiting time has
decreased; some would argue that they were grouped for purposes of
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applying the principle in a way that does not adequately reflect the
urgency of their needs.
Of course, it would be difficult to actually construct a priority
system that guarantees a pareto superior distribution. Nevertheless,
as a guiding principle, it could serve as a not entirely arbitrary way
to constrain the amount of priority to assign so that those who refuse
to register to donate will still benefit from the switch to a priority
incentive system.
D. PriorityIncentives Are Not Unfair
Any proposal to modify organ allocation necessarily raises
questions about fairness. In this regard, the following groups of
people can be separately considered: (1) those who register under a
priority proposal; (2) those who do not register but are also unwilling
to receive an organ; (3) those who do not register but would accept an
organ if they needed it; and (4) those who would register but for their
lack of awareness of the program.
As a preliminary matter, we need not worry about the first two
groups. The first category of people describes those who would choose
to register under a priority proposal. They will have made a decision
to help their fellow humans and perhaps themselves at the same
time. It is implausible to think that a person would feel coerced into
registering against his wishes. While some may argue, for example,
that offering financial incentives for live kidney donation would
disproportionately force the poor into donating organs,' 5 no similar
argument can be made in the priority context. Currently, every
person has the right to keep his organs undonated at death and
should be permitted to trade this right for waiting list priority.
Unlike financial incentives, we need not worry that priority
incentives will have discriminatory effects based on wealth, class,
race, or even health status. Assuming that awareness efforts are
sufficiently effective, each person may simply decide if he values a
small increase in his life expectancy more than a small possibility of
being a postmortem organ donor.
The second category of people not harmed by priority allocation
describes those who oppose both organ donation and organ
transplantation. 56' Many Christian Scientists, for example, will
neither donate organs nor receive organs, even to treat life155. See Shelby E. Robinson, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Proposed Systems for
Compensating Organ Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1019, 1040-41 (1999) (claiming
that the prevailing view is that financial incentives would disproportionately force the
poor to donate organs).
156. Of course, if they are more than just personally opposed to organ donation and
actually disapprove of the act of organ donation, then they will perceive themselves as
harmed by any proposal that induces more donations.
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threatening disease. Whether or not we agree with such views, they
do have a respectable consistency. Because of this consistency, such
Christian Scientists will neither increase nor decrease the supply of
organs available. Contrary to popular myth, most religions do not
oppose organ donation.' However, to the extent that religions or
belief systems do oppose donation, few would approve of organ
receipt, yet oppose donation.
Ostensibly of more concern are those who would take an organ
but would not donate one. Nearly half of those who would not donate
organs would still accept an organ if they needed one." 8 These people
are willing to benefit from a common resource without investing
anything to create it. On Monday, Alfred can express his religious or
aesthetic opposition to organ donation, and on Tuesday, perhaps
after being diagnosed with life-threatening liver failure, immediately
enter a waiting list for a new liver. Betty, on the other hand, may
have expressed a lifelong willingness to donate, may have
encouraged her family and friends to declare their intentions to
donate, and, under the current system, will enter the waiting list
under the same terms and with the same waiting time as Alfred. If
we are skittish at all about giving Betty preference over Alfred, we
must remember that the entire system of organ donation depends on
donors and families of donors who are more like Betty than they are
like Alfred. In a world of Alfreds, there would be no organ donation at
all.
People like Alfred typically hold inconsistent views.'59 Both
cadaveric donors and transplant patients have their bodies opened
and have organs removed. Thus, the processes of donation and
receipt are, in a certain sense, quite similar. It is difficult to think of
religious and aesthetic principles of general application that would
prohibit donation but not receipt. Of course, the fact that a person
holds inconsistent beliefs does not give us strong grounds for limiting
his access to lifesaving resources. However, we do have grounds to
create incentives that make people like Alfred reconsider their
157. See U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENT IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT 143

(1987); see also Laurence J. O'Connell, The Religious and Spiritual PerspectiveToward
Human Organ Donation and Transplantation, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 277 (Wayne Shelton & John Balint eds., 2001).
158.

THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION,

INC., supra note 6, at 12. Surely this number

would be even higher among those who discover that they actually need a transplant
in order to live.
159. Alfred's view is not necessarily inconsistent, for example, if he feels that the
organ donation system or the health care system, in general, will treat him worse than
others. Similarly, Alfred might refuse to donate because he finds the thought of being
buried without an organ to be terrifying. Yet, it is not inconsistent for him to receive
an organ from a person who is perfectly comfortable with organ donation.
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position, especially when their position can cost several human lives.
By contrast, we do need to worry about those who would donate
but are simply unaware of the priority incentive or suffer from
misconceptions about organ donation. To that extent, we would need
significant efforts to educate people. But we can take comfort for a
few reasons. First, as mentioned, the public attention surrounding a
priority program would likely generate more interest in and
awareness of registration and, subsequently, would generate more
registration than there is currently. Second, if a pareto superior
distribution principle is used to distribute organs, those that are
unaware of the priority program will fare no worse than they do
under the current system and will often fare better. Third, even if
some other allocation principle is used, this group may fare better
under a priority incentive scheme, depending on the extent of
induced donation and the way that induced donation is distributed.
For example, if enough donations were induced so that there
were no longer an organ shortage, then even a priority scheme which
did not seek to guarantee any particular distributional result would
still be pareto superior to our current system. While this result is
unlikely, to the extent we move in that direction, it is at least
possible that waiting times can be brought down for everyone. While
over 82,000 people are currently on organ waiting lists in the United
States, 7,000 to 23,000 bodies eligible for donation are not used each
year.16 Each of these bodies could have provided life-saving organs to
several people.' If a priority program could induce a significant
increase in the number of bodies donated, it is within the realm of
possibility that, over time, people would no longer have to die for
want of a donor organ. 6 '
E.

A Social-EntrepreneurialApproach

In the absence of a national government-sponsored priority
incentive program, private individuals have sought to create their
own priority incentives through the mutual agreement of a group of
160. See supra notes 12, 16 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 119.
162. This is especially true if technological advances can reduce our need for human
replacement organs. For example, in 2001 surgeons implanted the first self-contained
artificial heart in a human, and, though the patient died soon thereafter, the results
were considered better than expected. See Lawrence K. Altman, Surgeons Elated by
Heart Patient, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at Al. This patient received an artificial heart
because his condition made him a poor candidate for a transplanted human heart. Id.
We can easily imagine, however, a gradual transition process in which artificial organs
are relied on for a larger patient class. Further in the future, we may see "the
application of new technologies for growing human pluripotent stem cells that . ..
allow the manufacture of replacement organs and tissues autologous to their
recipients." Capron, supra note 19, at 334.
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organ donors.'63 In May 2002, David Undis launched "LifeSharers,"
an organization designed to implement just such a program."' Those
who register with16 LifeSharers agree to donate their organs to other
members in need. 5
Should a LifeSharers member ever need an organ, like nonmembers, he begins the process by joining the UNOS waiting list. If,
however, a LifeSharers member dies with organs eligible for
transplantation, the LifeSharers member highest on the UNOS
waiting list is supposed to get access to those organs before any nonmembers. If no LifeSharers member needs organs available from
another member, the organs are allocated according to the
traditional system.'66 Because members can draw organs from both
members and non-members, in exchange for joining, they have a
slightly higher chance of receiving an organ than do non-members.
There are currently over 1500 people who have joined
LifeSharers.'67 Membership is free and can be canceled without
penalty, except for the loss of one's priority status.' Though the
organization is small and has yet to play a role in the actual
allocation of an organ, LifeSharers hopes to "correct an inequity in
the current organ allocation system, which gives about 80% of' 69 all
organs to people who haven't agreed to donate their own organs."'
A privately-operated incentive program like LifeSharers has
great flexibility in setting eligibility requirements for joining.170

163. An early precedent for this kind of mutual insurance pool combined priority
and financial incentives. In 1985, soon after NOTA was passed, then-Senators Al Gore
and John Heinz called upon the Justice Department to investigate whether NOTA had
been violated by a group called the "Transplant Society." Margaret Engel, Insurance
Firm's Organ Transplant Idea May Be Investigated, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1985, at A5.
The Transplant Society planned an insurance system in which those willing to donate
their organs would receive priority in receiving organs, and, if their organs were
eventually harvested, $10,000 would be donated to their favorite charity. Id. A news
search did not reveal how the matter was resolved. Had the group avoided use of a
financial incentive, it would have received much less scrutiny.
164. LIFESHARERS, FAQ, at http://www.lifesharers.com/faq.asp (last visited Aug. 25,
2003).
165. LIFESHARERS, How IT WORKS, at http://www.lifesharers.com/howitworks.htm
(last visited Aug. 25, 2003).
166. Id.
167. LIFESHARERS, supra note 164.
168. Id.
169. Press Release, LifeSharers, LifeSharers Responds to Concerns Voiced by
UNOS (Mar. 7, 2003), at http://www.LifeSharers.com/pressrelease20030307.htm.
170. For example, LifeSharers could seek an actuarial match between the likelihood
that a participant's organs will be medically appropriate for transplantation and the
likelihood that the participant will need an organ. Similarly, the pool could require
health examinations as a condition of initial entry to make sure that all participants
have organs eligible for donation and no then-existing transplant needs. Or, to save
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Wisely, LifeSharers is quite inclusive, allowing anyone to join
(including children who are registered by a parent or legal
guardian). 7 ' To discourage members from waiting until they actually
need an organ to join, LifeSharers members do not become eligible
for priority receipt of an organ until 180 days after they register.172
To effectuate a priority allocation among its members,
LifeSharers takes advantage of provisions in both incarnations of the
UAGA which permit donors to direct their organ donations in various
ways. The UAGA of 1987, for example, allows donations to "a
designated individual for transplantation or therapy needed by that
individual."'73 Typically, this provision is used for live organ
donations, where a donor specifies that he is donating, for example,
his kidney to his brother. Interestingly, however, the provision refers
to a "designated individual" and not a "named individual."
Capitalizing on this difference, a LifeSharers member designates
that each of his organs goes to "that LifeSharers member who is the
most suitable match as defined by the criteria in general use at the
time of my death."'74 LifeSharers hopes and expects that OPOs will
honor this direction by giving organs donated by LifeSharers member
to the highest ranked LifeSharers member on the UNOS waiting
costs, it could investigate just those participants who subsequently enter the waiting
list for an organ in order to verify that they were unaware of this need at the time they
joined.
171. Press Release, LifeSharers, Parents Are Improving Transplant Odds for Their
Children (Jan. 16, 2003), at http://www.lifesharers.compressrelease20030ll6.htm.
172. LIFESHARERS, supra note 165. Given that the average waiting period for
certain organs can be several years, in order to get people to join before they actually
need an organ, LifeSharers might consider lengthening the wait for priority eligibility
or using different waiting periods for different organs.
173. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 6(a) (1987). In 1983, then-President Ronald
Reagan created controversy by making a radio appeal to the nation for a liver to be
donated to a particular eleven-month-old girl. Mark D. Fox, The Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUEs 43, 44
(Bethany Spielman ed., 1996).
174. LIFESHARERS, supra note 165. Strictly speaking, LifeSharers members agree to
donate their "organs and tissue" upon death. LIFESHARERS, JOIN HERE, at
https://www.lifesharers.com/enroll.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2003) (emphasis added).
LifeSharers does this because many of those ineligible to donate bodily organs due to a
variety of medical conditions can often still contribute bodily tissue, such as bone or
cartilage. Telephone Interview with David Undis, Executive Director, LifeSharers
(July 31, 2003); see also LIFESHARERS, supra note 165 ("Everybody's got something
that can be useful for transplantation, therapy, or medical research."). The policy,
therefore, contributes to LifeSharers broad efforts at inclusivity. It has the
unfortunate consequence, however, of implying that almost all LifeSharers members
are supposed to become tissue donors at death, since nearly everyone is eligible to
donate tissue. By contrast, it is rare for a person to die with organs eligible for
transplantation. Such a policy may alienate those who are willing to donate an organ
in order to save a life but not willing to donate tissue that could be used, for example,
in cosmetic surgery.
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list. " ' According to LifeSharers, when an organ becomes available:
If the organ is from a LifeSharers member, the LifeSharers
members (if any) on the UNOS waiting list for that organ get
preferred access to it. The OPO must offer the organ to them
first. [OPOs] can obtain a list of these members from
LifeSharers. If you are the highest-rated LifeSharers member
on the UNOS waiting list, the OPO will offer your transplant
center the organ. If your transplant center accepts the organ, it
will be harvested and sent to your center for your operation. If
they reject it, the OPO will contact the transplant center for the
next-highest-ranking LifeSharers member (if any) on the
waiting list. If the organ is not accepted for any LifeSharers
member, it will be offered to non-members.'76
Because no LifeSharers member has yet become an organ donor, the
process has not been put to the test. It is, therefore, unsettled
whether UNOS and regional OPOs will cooperate with LifeSharers'
plan.
At least as of February, 2003, UNOS had no plans to challenge
the legality of LifeSharers. 7 At the same time, however, the UNOS
Ethics Committee declined to offer its support.178 Mark Fox, chairman
of the committee, has said of LifeSharers: "Our concern is that it
essentially undermines the established organ allocation system by
creating a kind of special
class of 'LifeSharers members' that receive
79
special consideration."
LifeSharers offers two replies. First, LifeSharers notes that the
UNOS-supported
"Hope Through Sharing" program8'
uses
willingness to donate as a criterion in organ allocation. According to
LifeSharers, "[b]y endorsing Hope Through Sharing, UNOS has
shown a willingness to deviate from the use of clinically-relevant
175. If this procedure is challenged, LifeSharers may have alternative procedures to
accomplish a similar result. For example, the UAGA of 1987 provides that an
anatomical gift can be made to a physician or surgeon. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §
6(a). If so, it may be possible for LifeSharers members to agree to donate their organs
to a particular physician or surgeon affiliated with LifeSharers who would
subsequently effectuate an allocation aligned with LifeSharers' mission.
176. LIFESHARERS, supra note 165.
177. Sameh Fahmy, Share, and Share Alike, THE TENNESSEAN, Feb. 18, 2003, at
1D. This could change, of course, particularly when an OPO is eventually called upon
to allocate an organ from a LifeSharers donor.
178. Press Release, LifeSharers, LifeSharers Responds to Concerns Voiced by
UNOS (Mar. 7, 2003), at http://www.lifesharers.com/pressrelease20030307.htm; see
also UNOS ETHICS COMMITTEE, OPTN/UNOS ETHICS COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS (Nov. 14-15, 2002), available at http://www.unos.org/
members/docs/report_3.doc ("[Tihe Committee declined to endorse the mission of the
LifeSharers organization as such an action is beyond the scope of its charter.").
179. Fahmy, supra note 177.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
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characteristics in allocating organs, and we hope it will honor that
precedent with respect to LifeSharers." 8 ' LifeSharers could also
argue that it does not undermine the established allocation system
because that system permits donors to direct their organs in certain
ways, one of which is to those individuals who also agree to donate to
a mutual organ pool.'82
Second, as to Dr. Fox's concerns about creating a special class of
LifeSharers members, LifeSharers notes that membership is free and
open to everyone. People can join using the Internet at a public
library, or they can send a handwritten letter.183 "No one is excluded
from joining LifeSharers, and LifeSharers does not discriminate on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical
handicap, health status, marital status, or economic status.""' While
not everyone is aware of LifeSharers, LifeSharers is trying both to
spread organ donation awareness and to increase membership.
No doubt, UNOS also fears the formation of organizations
similar to LifeSharers but with less admirable motives. For example,
on very rare occasions, people have sought to use directed donation
provisions in the UAGA to donate organs only to members of a
particular "race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disease
group." 8 ' It is a matter of dispute whether such donations should be
prohibited, even though doing so may lead to a net loss of organs and,
hence, a net loss of life.18 Yet, even if it is difficult to craft policy to
easily distinguish desirable and undesirable directed donations, it
seems unfortunate to use this as a basis for prohibiting the

181. Press Release, LifeSharers, supra note 178.
182. More mischievously, LifeSharers could take the position that it does
undermine the established organ allocation system and that it does so to correct a
major deficiency in that process.
183. Telephone Interview with David Undis, Executive Director, LifeSharers (Apr.
2, 2003).
184. Press Release, LifeSharers, supra note 178.
185. VEATCH, supra note 23, at 392 (describing an instance where family members
of a Ku KJux Klan sympathizer sought to make his organs available for "donation to
White recipients only"). UNOS has taken a position against such directed donation,
seeking to add the following language to the UAGA: "Donation of an organ may not be
made in a manner which discriminates against a person or class of persons on the
basis of race, national origin, religion, gender or similar characteristic." UNOS BOARD
OF DIRECTORS, DIRECTED DONATION REFERENCE STATEMENT (June 1996), available at
http://www.unos.org/resources/bioethics.asp?index= 10; see also Stephanie Strom,
Giving of Yourself, Literally, to People You've Never Met, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2003, at
WK3 (describing a white man who specified that his kidney be donated "to 'a lowincome African American' because African-Americans have greater difficulty getting
kidneys from family members").
186. See VEATCH, supra note 23, at 393-411 (criticizing discriminatory directed
donation even though "everyone below the privileged recipient is actually made better
off because of the discrimination" because "[tihey all move up on the waiting list").
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admirable aims of LifeSharers.
Still, the size and scope of a national priority incentive program
would give it several advantages over a private program.'87 First, it
may take a long time until an organization like LifeSharers can
attract enough members to create a priority incentive strong enough
to induce substantial registrations from those who are otherwise
reluctant to donate. Meanwhile, a change in the UNOS allocation
formulas could alter incentives practically overnight, and UNOS has
an established network to make the public aware of a national
priority program. Second, a non-profit organization like LifeSharers,
which is run on charitable donations, may not be well equipped to
run an organization with a requisitely large membership, and NOTA
makes it difficult to charge membership fees. Third, for LifeSharers
to best accomplish its objectives, UNOS will have to cooperate, and
such cooperation must be smooth and effective given the short time
available to make organ allocation decisions. Fourth, those who
register to donate probably ought not receive absolute priority over
those who do not. If they did, a very sick person in the private organ
pool who is a poor match for a LifeSharers organ could get the organ
before a comparatively less sick person who is a much better match
for the organ but is not a LifeSharers member. LifeSharers argues
that it is not required to give a LifeSharers organ to a member that is
l but this policy would have to be worked out
not a "suitable match,"88
in more detail. It is an advantage of a national priority scheme that it
can more easily make willingness to donate one of several factors in
organ allocation. Fifth, a government-sponsored incentive program
can better ensure compliance with the obligation of participants to
donate than can a private organization like LifeSharers. Finally,
with a national priority incentive scheme, everyone who registers to
donate receives priority on equal terms, regardless of whether or not
he is aware of programs like LifeSharers.
Given these concerns, an organization like LifeSharers may
serve its highest role by prodding policymakers to create a national
priority incentive program. LifeSharers can generate momentum to
institute such a change either by demonstrating the popularity of
priority incentives or by making policymakers fear losing control over
organ allocation as more and more organs bypass the government's
allocation monopoly.
V. A RESPONSE TO Two CRITIQUES OF DONATION INCENTIVE
187. This position is taken in Schwindt & Vining, supra note 5, at 730-35.
LifeSharers' Executive Director agrees, assuming that priority incentives under a

national program are strong enough to induce sufficient donations. Telephone
Interview with David Undis, supra note 183.
188. Telephone Interview with David Undis, supra note 174.
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PROGRAMS

Those who favor the status quo system of organ donation tout
the opportunities it creates for altruistic behavior. They argue that
donation incentives, be they financial or priority-based, give people
non-altruistic reasons to donate and arguably weaken the altruistic
framework at the core of our current system. Many also argue
against donation incentives out of fear that they will turn human
organs, and ultimately humans themselves, into commodities. Such
commodification, so the argument goes, eviscerates important
qualities of human personhood. In this section, I respond to these
critiques and attempt to reveal the stunning hypocrisy of our
entrenched system of organ donation which, in the name of altruism
and human dignity, leads to unnecessary, preventable pain and
death.
A.

The Altruism Argument Against Financialand Priority
Incentives

Under the current system, donation is supposed to be principally
motivated by altruism-awareness campaigns encourage us to
register to make a "gift of life."1 9 Staunch defenders of the gift of life
metaphor challenge any donation arrangement not based purely on
altruistic donation. They frequently cite Richard Titmuss's in-depth
study of blood donations in England and the United States,19 which
argued that voluntary systems of blood donation wasted less blood
and were safer than commercial systems."' Titmuss also argued that
a completely voluntary system of blood donation nurtures altruistic
tendencies, while a paid system encourages coercion and
constraint.' Speaking of unpaid blood donors, Titmuss wrote:
As individuals they were, it may be said, taking part in the
creation of a greater good transcending the good of self-love. To
"love" themselves they recognized the need to "love" strangers.
By contrast, one of the functions of atomistic private market

189. See, e.g., Paul Lauritzen et al., The Gift of Life and the Common Good, 31
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29, 29-35 (2001); GIFT OF LIFE DONOR PROGRAM, GIFT OF LIFE
DONOR PROGRAM, at http://www.donorsl.org/index-flash.html (last visited Aug. 25,
2003).
190. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL
POLICY (1971).
191. Id. at 22, 154-55.
192. Id. at 239. Titmuss wrote:
[A]s this study has shown comparatively, private market systems in the
United States and other countries not only deprive men of their freedom to
choose to give or not to give but by so doing escalate other coercive forces in
the social system which lead to the denial of freedom ....
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systems is to "free" men from any sense of obligation to or for
other men regardless of the consequences to others who cannot

reciprocate.1"'
According to Titmuss, "in the free gift of blood to unnamed strangers
[there is] no contract of custom, no legal bond, no functional
determinism, no situations of discriminatory power, domination,
constraint or compulsion, no sense of shame or guilt, no gratitude
imperative and no need for the penitence of Chrysostom." 194 It is
argued that these sorts of benefits apply to organ donation as well.195
1.

The Consequentialist Defense of Altruistic Donation

There are at least two kinds of arguments to defend the giftgiving aspect of our current organ donation regime. The
consequentialist argument says that an altruistic policy of organ
donation actually maximizes the total number of organs available for
transplantation. For example, it has been argued that gift-giving by
some encourages gift-giving by others.19 If donation is viewed as
socially appropriate and socially expected, the hope is that more
people will donate. This argument says that altruistic organ donation
promotes altruistic organ donation through a virtuous cycle.
Furthermore, many would be so opposed to the idea of financial or
other non-altruistic incentives that the mere existence of such
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Edmund D. Pellegrino, Families' Self-Interest and the Cadaver's
Organs: What Price Consent, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 205-06 (Arthur L.
Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998) (citing Titmuss to support altruistic organ
donation).
Titmuss's claims have been challenged on both empirical and philosophical grounds.
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343 (1972);
Harvey M. Sapolsky & Stan N. Finkelstein, Blood Policy Revisited: A New Look at 'The
Gift Relationship,' 46 PUB. INT. 15 (1977). But accepting Titmuss's claims as true,
reliance on his study in the context of cadaveric organ donation is misplaced. First, one
of the biggest benefits of a voluntary system of blood donation that Titmuss observed
was that the quality of blood was higher from volunteers whereas paid donors tended
to be poorer and had a greater incentive to lie about whether or not they had hepatitis
or other then-undetectable diseases transmitted by blood. TITMUSS, supra note 190, at
154-55. For obvious reasons, organ quality among cadavers will not be influenced by
donation incentive schemes, and nowadays, medical scientists are quite capable of
assessing organ quality before an organ is used in transplantation. Second and more
importantly, there is no life threatening shortage of blood, but there is a life
threatening shortage of organs. Altruistic gift-giving has failed to furnish a sufficient
incentive to encourage donor registration.
196. See EDWARD W. NELSON ET AL., UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING ETHICS
COMMITTEE, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORGAN DONATION (1993), available at
http://www.unos.org/Resources/bioethics.asp?index=3 ("[I]t has been suggested that
donation rates could decrease under [a financial incentive] system due to a backlash
and losses from the current donor pool based on pure altruistic giving.").
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incentives would cause organ donation rates to decline. This
argument assumes one might reason as follows: "I was going to
donate my organs at death in exchange for nothing at all should they
ever be needed, but since you are going to offer me allocation priority
should I ever need it (or since you're going to offer my family $10,000
should my organs ever be used after my death), I am instead going to
deny my organs to everyone."
The consequentialist defense of altruistic donation focuses less
on the meaning of gift-giving to society and more on its effects on the
supply of organs available for donation.197 Of course, if it were true
that altruistic gift-giving makes more organs available for transplant
than would incentive schemes, we would have a compelling reason to
maintain the status quo emphasis on altruistic donation. In fact, this
view flies in the face of any reasonable understanding of human
nature and behavior, and there is no good empirical evidence to
support it. 9'
2.

The Deontological Defense of Altruistic Donation

A better argument in favor of altruistic donation implicitly
admits that altruistic giving leads to less organ donation than
incentivized giving.'99 More importantly, proponents of this view
argue, altruistic donation is preferable to incentivized giving because
it connects unrelated people and communities through unselfish
support and kinship.' Advocates of this position do not deny that if
we give people an incentive to register to donate, we will increase

197. A similarly farfetched consequentialist position could argue that altruistic
organ donation better promotes total social welfare than does incentivized donation,
even if altruistic donation harms waiting list patients, because altruistic organ
donation encourages positive altruistic behavior in other walks of life.
198. See THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 6, at 43 (indicating that
financial incentives make more than twice as many people more likely to donate than
they make less likely to donate). Thus, even if financial incentives offer only a slight
inducement to donate, it is likely that they would have a net positive effect on organ
supply.
199. See, e.g., Pellegrino, supra note 195, at 206 ("For patients to die waiting for an
available lifesaving organ is an indictment of the level of altruism in our society, but
not a sufficient reason for eliminating altruism itself.").
200. Speaking of our blood donation system, Thomas Murray writes:
It is a massive effort at giving to strangers. Roughly eight million Americans
donate each year. In its scale, its lack of monetary rewards, and its distance
between donor and recipients, the whole-blood procurement system in the
U.S. is a remarkable example of impersonal gifts. It suggests something very
important that a society would be so generous in this realm and would reject
so clearly a market approach to the supply and distribution of a good.
Thomas H. Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers, 17 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 30, 36 (APR. 1987). "Giving blood to strangers is not just any gift, but a
vital one that expresses and affirms our bonds with those strangers." Id.
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total organ donation, but they bemoan the reduction in altruistic
organ donation it will cause and believe society will be the worse for
it. 201 This view does require us to see the societal merits of altruistic
donation as an end in itself, since the view cannot be justified solely
by appeal to its effects on the organ supply.
3.

Where is the Altruism?

The much-vaunted altruism in our current organ donation
system, however, is not so easy to find."'2 To act altruistically, one
must act with an appropriate other-regarding motivation.02 For
example, if I offer a "gift" solely to receive something better in return,
rather than making a gift, I have made an investment. Similarly, if I
offer a "gift" solely because I am socially expected to, I have again
made more an investment than an altruistic transfer. Conversely,
the mere fact that a particular gift will generate more self-regarding
benefits than self-regarding costs for the giver does not necessarily
negate the giver's altruistic, other-regarding motivations. Without
offering a detailed explanation of all the necessary and sufficient
conditions for altruism to flourish, it is clear that gift-giving is only
altruistic if it is done with an altruistic motivation.
The requirement that altruistic gifts be altruistically motivated
presents a challenge to defenders of the status quo system of
cadaveric donation. Obviously, cadavers cannot act altruistically
since they can neither act nor have motivations. This seemingly
obvious point is clearly not reflected in the rhetoric which proclaims
cadaveric organ donors as heroes, even when the proclamation gives
no regard to whether the deceased donor actually played any role in
the decision to use his organs.0 4
201. See, e.g., Pellegrino, supra note 195, at 205-06 ("To create a deliberate conflict
between altruism and self-interest is to reduce our freedom to make a gift to a
stranger. This ... has serious destructive effects, ethical and nonethical, on the whole
of a society.") (citations omitted).
202. Cadaveric organ donation represents an extremely impersonal kind of giftgiving, as cadaveric organ donors never know the recipient of their gifts. Concerning
voluntary donations to blood banks, Kenneth Arrow writes that they represent "an
expression of impersonal altruism [that] is as far removed from the feelings of personal
interaction as any marketplace." Arrow, supra note 195, at 360. Arrow's statement is
all the more true for cadaveric organ donation. A blood donor is at least aware that he
is making a gift, but an organ donor, at most, knows only that he is gifting a negligible
probability of making a gift.
203. See generally THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1978).
204. MARK O'BRIEN, SON DIES, FATHER WORKS SO OTHERS MAY LIVE, at
http://www.nsagiftoflife.org/opinionarticle.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2003) (quoting
Charles McCluskey, executive director of the Organ Procurement Program, stating
that a cadaveric donor who never signed an organ donation card nor discussed the
matter with his family was "'a hero' in the eyes of recipients"). The rhetoric of heroism
plays a large role in programs aimed at encouraging donor registration with many
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To the extent that cadaveric donors act altruistically at all, they
do so when they agree to donate their organs upon death, making the
decision while they are still alive and capable of both acting and
having motivations. Yet, even when people pledge to donate their
organs, they have hardly demonstrated altruistic behavior of heroic
proportions, given the extraordinarily low probability that any
particular organ pledger will ever actually donate an organ."'
Furthermore, if you believe that registering to donate is morally
required, as hinted at by our trolley problems in Part III, registering
to donate seems less like supererogatory altruism and more like
quotidian moral duty." 6
Assuming donation is not morally required, signing a donor card
does demonstrate some altruistic behavior. But such altruism hardly
claims responsibility for much donation in our current system since
most people do not express their donation preferences and, even
when they do, doctors still refuse to transplant organs without family
consent." 7
Perhaps it is better to consider whether virtue accrues to those
who donate the organs of their loved ones. Yet, it seems hard to
understand why they should accrue moral credit for donating
someone else's body parts. Organ donation does not interfere with
burial or other death rituals, and as Joel Feinberg has noted, "it is
difficult to understand how the thought of bodies having their organs
removed before burial can be more depressing than the thought of
them festering in the cold ground or going up in flames."2 8

advocates using slogans like, "Be a hero for life." See, e.g., MD. MOTOR VEHICLE ASS'N,
at http://mva.state.md.us/MVAProg/ORGAN/
THE ORGAN DONOR PROGRAM,
default.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2003).
205. There is significant philosophical literature on "moral luck" which argues that
the moral credit or blame for one's actions need not be limited by the intentions of the
actor. If we accept this view, one could argue that a pledger whose organs are actually
used is "morally lucky" and deserves credit beyond that of someone else who made an
equally sincere pledge to donate but whose organs, as fate would have it, are never
actually used.
Yet, even those who believe that our moral credit and blame for some outcome
outstrips our control over the outcome would likely still agree that a donor cadaver
cannot be morally lucky where the donor neither acted nor held intentions concerning
organ donation. For a collection of essays on this subject, see MORAL LUCK (Daniel
Statman ed., 1993). For an argument against the existence of genuine moral luck, see
Adam J. Kolber, The Moral of Moral Luck (1996) (unpublished senior thesis, Princeton
University) (on file with author).
206. See Peters, supra note 5, at 167-77 (arguing that consent to organ donation "is
not an act of charity" but "a moral duty of substantial stringency").
207. See supra text accompanying notes 63-72.
208. Joel Feinberg, The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
31, 36 (Feb. 1985). The supposed necessity of a ritual burial can, however, have a
dramatic hold on the human psyche. In the famous criminal procedure case Brewer v.
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Nevertheless, survivors do make a valuable contribution when
we ask them to carefully consider the preferences of their recently
deceased relative when they would much prefer to be grieving in
private without interference from medical personnel. Thus, families
and other survivors do make a substantial sacrifice. But, the sacrifice
they make is independent of any actual organ transfer. The family is
supposed to be deciding the preferences of the deceased (at least
when the deceased was an adult). Therefore, upon thoughtfully
deciding, family members have made the same sacrifice whether or
not they choose to donate. Furthermore, the sacrifice made by family
members derives from our inability to give people appropriate
incentives to register their own donation preferences while alive and
from our concomitant lack of steadfastness in honoring those
preferences when made. We should hardly take credit for the
sacrifices made by families that arise largely as an artifact of an
imperfect donation system which we impose upon grieving families
during their private moments of mourning.
When parents donate a child's organs, it is perhaps easier to see
heroic altruism in action. Though a parent is still donating someone
else's body parts, if the child is very young, the parents' decision and
the child's decision are arguably one and the same. Margaret Jane
Radin offers this eloquent example:
Imagine the case of grief-stricken parents being asked to donate
the heart of a brain-dead child to a newborn victim of congenital
heart disease in a distant hospital. The parents are being asked
to give up the symbolic integrity of their child and face
immediately the brute fact of death. The act of donating the
heart may be one of those distinctively human moments of
terrible glory in which one gives up a significant aspect of
oneself so that others may live and flourish." 9
But even if we were to credit parents for donating their children's
organs, Radin's vignette identifies little altruistic behavior. First, the
example is somewhat misleading, because, as noted, the parents
must "face immediately the brute fact of death" when asked to donate
whether or not they ultimately decide to do so. Second, donations
from young children account for only a portion of the entire pool of
organs donated. Third, we may question why Radin is so solicitous of
parents' desire to maintain their child's symbolic integrity, when
there is another child's symbolic and actual integrity at stake here.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), an accused murderer was prompted to reveal the
location of a murder victim when police officers warned him that "the parents of this
little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial." Id. at 393. Granted, the accused
was mentally ill and quite susceptible to persuasion. See id. However, he was cajoled
by a concept deeply rooted in many religious traditions.
209. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 97 (1996).
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Radin praises "those distinctively human moments of terrible glory
in which one gives up a significant aspect of oneself so that others
may live and flourish." 210 Yet, only about half of these stories end
with such human moments." The other half end with distinctively
inhumane moments of indecision, uncertainty, and perhaps even
selfishness in which another child dies because parents made a
decision, not of terrible glory, but of terrible consequences.
Altruism in the current system is also elusive because
alternative, non-altruistic behaviors are illegal. When laws and
regulations prevent or otherwise hinder organ sales or other
mutually advantageous transactions, they reduce opportunities to act
non-altruistically. It is, therefore, not surprising that some people
choose to donate. But surely the altruism inherent in a gift is partly a
function of what the giver forgoes by making the gift. If a person
donates to charity a tattered old t-shirt which he would otherwise
throw away, we have relatively little evidence that the donor had an
other-regarding motivation, and so he probably gets little credit for
making the gift. In contrast, when a homeless person takes a few
coins out of his jar to help another homeless person with fewer coins,
he demonstrates a substantial other-regarding motivation, since he
likely very much values that with which he parts.
Current law saps organs of their market value, which reduces
the opportunity costs of those who decide to donate. Thus, there is
less evidence for other-regarding motivations in our current system
than there would be under incentive schemes. To witness truly
altruistic behavior, we should give
people non-altruistic
opportunities. Those who persist in altruistic donation will show that
their altruism was not just an artifact of their limited range of selfinuring options.
No donation incentive program requires people to accept the
benefits of participation. Under a priority incentive scheme, one
could pledge to donate organs and specifically disavow any beneficial
priority received. Or, under a financial incentive program, one could
refuse compensation or donate the money to charity. Thus, even
under incentive schemes, there are still opportunities for purely
altruistic donation.
Radin thinks the matter is more complicated than that.
According to Radin, the existence of incentive schemes may sully the
nature of even purely altruistic donation. Consider how she extends
her preceding example:
But now imagine the experience if the grieving parents know
that the market price of hearts is $50,000. There seems to be a
210. Id.
211. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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sense that the heroic moment [of purely altruistic donation]
now cannot be, either for them to experience or for us to
observe, in respect and perhaps recognition. If the parents take
the money, then the money is the reason for their action; or at
best neither we nor they themselves will ever know that the
money was not the reason for the action. 212
Contrary to Radin, however, just because a family accepts money to
donate does not mean that the money was the reason for the action.
Nor is it true that it is impossible to know if the family had some
other driving motivation. Radin allows too little opportunity for the
family members to introspect and simply ask themselves to consider
their reasons for donating (which may or may not relate to the
financial incentive) and to consider how they would have acted
without the incentive. Similarly, we can and must reach our own
conclusions as to what we think motivated the family's decision, just
as we must do when no incentives are involved. For example, in the
non-incentive example, Radin suggests that we are capable of
appreciating the "terrible glory" of the parents who decide to
donate." But how do we know that the family was so concerned with
the "symbolic integrity" 4 of their child? Perhaps the parents donated
to avoid feelings of guilt from not donating, or they appreciated the
positive social consequences of being viewed as parents who made a
"gift of life." We can only understand their decision by extrapolating
the beliefs of the parents from their actions and from whatever else
we know about them. Thus, we could quite easily determine that
certain parents who donated their child's organs under a financial
incentive scheme would have done so even in the absence of a nonaltruistic incentive.
Radin fears, however, that if the parents "don't take the money,
then their act can seem like transferring 'their' $50,000 to the
transplant recipient."" 5 She goes on to qualify this statement and
question whether "once something is monetized for some it is
monetized for all."218 But, even if donating an organ becomes viewed
as donating $50,000, does that mean, as Radin suggests, that "[n]o
matter what choice the 1parents
make, the opportunity for a pure act
7
of caring is foreclosed"?
It is not at all clear why a donation of money is less of a pure act
of caring than a donation of an organ.2"8 A donation of $50,000 is not
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

RADIN, supra note 209, at 97.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
I shall argue in the next section that, as a matter of social policy, according to
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such a valuable gift if viewed only as a way of purchasing a luxury
item like a fancy sports car. If, however, money is viewed as a way of
purchasing a life-saving organ, a donation of $50,000 becomes quite
valuable. When money becomes commensurable with a life-saving
organ, rather than viewing the value of organs as infected by a
relationship to money, we can view money as more valuable because
of its ability to buy something that is truly important.
Also, if viewing some donation in terms of its dollar value is
enough to make the donation impure, then even donations under the
current system may be impure, since every donation has a
counterfactual market value (a market value in a world where the
donated item could have been sold). Perhaps while agreeing to
donate, a donor says to himself, "I will gratuitously donate my
relative's organs because the law prohibits me from selling them to a
fertilizer company." Donation from this individual is not very
altruistic at all, even though his motivation is sullied only by his
beliefs about how he would act under counterfactual circumstances.
Certainly, the motivation of this donor (under our current scheme) is
less pure than the motivation of the donor who declines $50,000
(under a financial incentive scheme) but donates his relative's organs
anyhow. Thus, even if we prohibit the exchange of organs through
markets, we can never prohibit organs from having a counterfactual
market value, and we can never be sure that those who do donate
under an "altruistic" scheme, in fact, have altruistic motivations of
real significance.
4.

Altruism Embedded in Social Policy

Perhaps the altruism of our current system derives not so much
from discrete altruistic actions but rather, as some have argued, from
a social policy that is designed to reflect and contribute to community
connectedness through the mutual kindness of strangers." 9 In a
sense, it is our decision as a society to supply organs as we do that is
a kind of gift, and it is our group decision which has positive benefits
for the community as a whole.
Such a view, however, raises motivation problems of a different
sort. The primary beneficiary of our altruistic endeavor is supposed
to be the organ waiting list community. Yet, almost everyone agrees
that an incentive program would encourage more donation than
would a purely altruistic approach. Those who need organs in order
to survive would almost certainly prefer more organs "unfortunately"
the way Radin understands acts of caring, waiting list patients-the purported
beneficiaries of our altruistic caring-would prefer more frequent acts of less caring
organ donation than less frequents acts of more caring organ donation. See infra text
accompanying notes 219-26.
219. See supra note 200.
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made available by incentivized donors rather than fewer organs
"fortunately" made available by altruistic donors. Virtually all of
those on a waiting list will prefer an organ donation system which
maximizes their life span by increasing the probability they will
receive an organ. So the gift of altruistic donation that we make to
the waiting list community is less desirable from its perspective than
other approaches we could take.
It is as if the institution of organ donation is being used as a
means to further another goal not specifically related to organ
donation. Yet this other goal, the proliferation of community-wide
altruism, is undercut almost entirely by the fact that it comes at a
huge cost to the intended beneficiaries of our gift of life. There is
more than a mere tradeoff between lives lost under the current
system and the promotion of societal altruism. Rather, societal
altruism, understood as a positive side-effect of some social policy, is
greatly undermined when we knowingly seek societal altruism at the
expense of human lives. The societal altruism argument, therefore,
fails on its own terms.
The following examples illustrate this point. In the first scenario,
it is appropriate to balance the positive effects of altruism with other
goals, like effective resource allocation.

Balanceville's Garage Sale
Balanceville is a small, rural community of thirty families near
formerly prosperous coal mines. For a period of several years,
the village held an annual garage sale where residents found
that they could inexpensively buy items they needed, sell their
junk, and keep village money circulating locally. The plan was
quite successful at creating an effective system of resource
allocation.
One year, the village decided that instead of having an annual
garage sale where residents treat each other as customers, they
would have an annual gift exchange. Residents would simply
give items to other families. Due to the small size of the
community, the process was quite successful. Even though
residents did not always get what they needed and the resource
allocation was not as good as it used to be, they preferred this
system because it better promoted community spirit.
It is plausible that Balanceville's new altruistic system of exchange
offers benefits that offset its deficiencies in allocating resources. This
is another way of saying that, sometimes, "it's the thought that
counts." But consider this variation:
Resourceville's Fundraiser
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Resourceville is a small, rural community of thirty families
near formerly prosperous coal mines. Some of the children in
the community have a rare disease resulting from the leakage
of chemicals used in the mining process. A few years ago, the
village decided to host an annual fundraiser where each family
would simultaneously hold a garage sale, and 10% of all
revenue would be used to support the sick children. This system
worked out well with respect to resource allocation and also
generated considerable funds for the children.
One year, Resourceville decides instead to turn the fundraiser
into an annual gift exchange. Families were encouraged to give
gifts to each other but were also encouraged to give gifts that
would be used specifically to support the sick children. Resource
allocation was not quite as good as it was under the garage sale
system. Furthermore, the children received significantly less
than they did under the previous system. Now, the members of
the village are to vote on what system to use in future years.
Assume that under the gift exchange fundraiser, families would
give more to the sick children than they did this year but that it
is very unlikely to reach the same level of giving that would
occur through the garage sale revenue system.
In this case, Resourceville needs to decide on one of two
fundraising systems. But here, we ought not balance the benefits of
altruistic giving with the reduced funding for the children. The
knowledge that the new fundraiser is inferior to the old, assuming
this knowledge is available to members of the village, infects the
entire gift exchange and undermines its altruistic benefits. If the gift
exchange was created for the purpose of helping sick children, then it
will and ought to be evaluated primarily on its ability to generate
resources for that purpose. Why should the community feel good
about gift-giving when it knows that such a system will provide less
to the very people which prompted the gift exchange in the first
place? To choose the gift exchange in future years is to use the
fundraiser as a means to promote a goal that comes at a cost to the
sick children.22 ° How can that cost be viewed as offset by the benefit
of positive community sentiment? By analogy, the altruistic goals of
our current system of cadaveric organ donation are undermined
entirely by the fact that our system is clearly inferior to others in
achieving our primary goal.
These examples illustrate the point that a gift is assessed not in
220. Should it matter that Resourceville used the garage sale system first and then
switched to the gift exchange program? It is hard to see why the order should matter.
So long as people know that the garage sale system better serves the sick children
without adding to the burden of villagers in any significant way, it is hard to defend
the use of the gift exchange program.
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a vacuum but in the context of the gift's intended effect on its
recipient. Foolish giving is only virtuous if the giver truly is a fool.
But if a person knows that he is giving foolishly, this fact detracts
from the quality of the gift. In 0. Henry's famous short story, The
Gift of the Magi,221 Della and her husband, Jim, are a young, cashstrapped couple purchasing Christmas gifts for each other. 2 Della
sells her long beautiful hair to buy a watch strap for her husband
who, unbeknownst to her, sold his watch to buy Della a set of fine
combs for her hair.2 3 We can imagine no worse allocation of resources
for Della and Jim, and therein lies the tragic beauty of the story.
Each gives something of tremendous personal value to buy
something believed to be of tremendous value to his or her partner.
But this tragic beauty would be utterly shattered if we imagine that
Jim discovered his wife's plan to sell her hair and bought her the
combs anyhow. The symbolic meaning of Jim's gift would evaporate
entirely. Likewise, policymakers are aware that altruistic donation
leads to a less desirable allocation of resources than could be
achieved with incentives, and this awareness largely eviscerates the
virtue of the current system.
5.

The Tyranny of the Gift

Lastly, even if we do isolate some wonderfully altruistic
component of our current organ donation scheme, it is not as though
altruistic behavior is incontrovertibly desirable. One problem with
altruistic organ donation is that it is almost entirely non-reciprocal.
From one perspective, that is what makes organ donation an act of
incomparable, other-regarding sentiment. But there is a less
attractive element to one-sided giving. If two people are on a first
date, and one begins the date by offering a very expensive gift, the
other should rightfully be hesitant to accept. Doing so may create an
undesirable expectation of reciprocity. And the inability to or
undesirability of reciprocating is a good ground to decline the gift.
In the case of cadaveric organ donation, reciprocity is almost
impossible. We might think that the feeling of obligation to
reciprocate would disappear, however, when one's gift-giver has died.
In fact, researchers have noted a kind of "tyranny" 4 in organ giving
where recipients are distressed by their inability to meaningfully
offer reciprocal gifts to their benefactors. Such concerns have led

221. 0. HENRY, The Gift of the Magi, in THE GIFT OF THE MAGI AND OTHER STORIES
191 (William Morrow 1997).
222. Id. at 199-200.
223. Id.
224. RENEE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 40 (1992).
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most organ transplant teams not to reveal the identity of cadaveric
organ donors to organ recipients:
During the early years of human organ transplants, medical
teams were inclined to reveal the identities of the donors of
cadaver organs, their recipients, and their families to one
another, and to provide them with details about each other's
backgrounds and lives.... However, with the passage of time
and increased clinical experience, transplant teams became
more wary about the information they conveyed. A littlediscussed policy of anonymity surrounding cadaver transplants
gradually developed. The transplanters were discomfited by the
way in which recipients, their kin, and donor families
personified cadaver organs, and about how many of them not
only arranged to meet but tried to become involved in each
other's lives as if they were indebted and related to one another.
These interactions were major factors that led most transplant
units to establish the normative practice of not telling the
recipient about the donor or the donor's family about the
recipient. 25
And just as recipients seek to repay their donors, donor families
sometimes seek to overly identify with the recipients of their loved
one's organs or to seek recognition from the recipient. As one doctor
notes:
We've had instances where the donor family has gotten in touch
with the recipient family; sometimes that's good and sometimes
that's bad. Mostly we think its bad. Donor families think that
when they donate something, certainly the heart-the loved one
lives on in some way. But a donation is a gift. When you give
somebody a gift, you don't ask them, "How's my chess set that I
gave you? How's the basketball I gave you?" The same is true
with organs. We don't want people saying, "How's Johnny's
heart? Are you taking good care of it?" Some people feel that
just because you have their brother's heart in you, they have
some influence over your life. And we don't like to foster that
feeling at all. We like to keep them very removed from each
other. 26
Although we do not need to draw any strong conclusions from the
"tyranny" associated with altruistic organ donation, it does provide a
valuable counterpoint to those who consider altruistic behavior to be
an unqualified good.
With a priority incentive program, those who receive an organ
from a priority-eligible donor will know that the donor received some
benefit in life from declaring his willingness to donate. Similarly, a

225.

Id. at 37.

226.

INA YALOF, LIFE AND DEATH: THE STORY OF A HOSPITAL 55-56 (1990).
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recipient who is priority eligible will know that he has given
something up in order to receive priority. In a world with priority
incentives, donor and recipient have both benefited from their
arrangement, and no one need feel indebted for eternity.
B.

Commodification as Harmful to Personhood

Defenders of the status quo also criticize donation incentives for
creating an undesirable commodification of bodies and body parts.
Financial incentive schemes are particularly castigated, but a
commodification critique has been leveled at priority incentives as
well. Alexander Capron charges that an allocation system that
prioritizes those who have expressed a willingness to donate "not
only commodifies organs in a way that clearly invites a full-fledged
market, but it abandons the whole idea of voluntariness that has
been at the heart of the transplant system." 27 Those who press such
critiques fear that incentives, whether financial or priority-based,
will debase the value of the human body and encourage social
isolation and disconnectedness. Worse yet, anti-commodificationists
warn that commodification of one area of life, while not necessarily
bad in and of itself, can spread to other more delicate arenas.
In her book, Contested Commodities,22 Margaret Jane Radin
warns of the dangers of treating too many aspects of human life as
open for purchase or sale. When we treat our bodies and our
relationships with others as marketable commodities, according to
Radin, we risk losing sight of our individual self-worth, and we risk
turning healthy, fulfilling relationships with people into anonymous,
discrete, relatively meaningless transactions." 9 The advantages that
markets can have in efficiently allocating certain resources
sometimes come at a cost to our relationships with others and to
ourselves, and this cost is so fundamental that it should not simply
be weighed along with other factors in the economist's utilitarianstyle calculus. 3 °
Radin is particularly critical of those law and economics scholars

227. A.M. Capron, More Blessed to Give Than to Receive?, 24 TRANSPLANTATION
PROC. 2185, 2185 (1992); see also Laurie G. Futterman, Presumed Consent: The
Solution to the Critical Donor Shortage, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 161,
165 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998) ("Proposals such as future
contracts, rewarded giving, and direct financial gain imply some form of organ
commerce.") (emphasis added, citations omitted).
228. RADIN, supra note 209.
229. If life becomes commodified to the extreme, Radin notes: "All social
interactions are conceived of as free market exchanges.... In the framework of
universal commodification, the functions of government, wisdom, a healthful
environment, and the right to bear children are all commodities." Id. at 2-3.
230. Id. at 3-6 (criticizing the methodology of many law and economics scholars).
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as the sale or trade of fungible
of supply and demand come to
all of human behavior is viewed in
we have embraced the idea of
The
"archetype
of universal
commodification presents a one-dimensional world of value. From the
perspective of universal commodification, all things desired or
valued-from personal attributes to good government-are
commodities."232
Radin famously distinguishes between two different kinds of
property that help us to determine when commodification is
particularly inappropriate. "Fungible property," refers to "property
that we do not understand to be justifiably bound up with the self,
but rather understand to be separate from the self in the sense that
Among my fungible
[it is] not implicated in self-constitution."'
property, I count my television, my toaster, and the Eisenhower
silver dollar that I recently bought at a coin shop. None of these
items is uniquely attached to me in any important way. In contrast,
"personal property" refers to "property that we understand to be
bound up with the self in a way that we understand as morally
justifiable."" 4 Among my personal property, I count my collection of
family videos, my stand-up comedy routine, and the Eisenhower
silver dollar that was given to me by my grandfather shortly before
his death. So, for example, while I would sell my recently-purchased
silver dollar for some price a little higher than its market value, I
would refuse to do the same for the silver dollar from my
grandfather, even though I consider the silver dollars identical in all
of their current physical properties. And, of course, property may
have mixed features of Radin's two categories:
who would treat all exchange
commodities.231 When the laws
dominate our thinking such that
terms of market transactions,
"universal commodification."

In human life as we know it, self-constitution includes
connectedness with other human beings and also with things in
the world, with a home, for example .... When an item of
property is involved with self-constitution in this way, it is no
231. Id. at 4 (discussing analyses by Richard Posner and Gary Becker which
"straightforwardly speak[] of children as a commodity").
232. Id. at 2. According to Radin, under universal commodification, "the person is a
commodity-holder: universal commodification describes in monetary terms all things
of value to the person-including personal attributes, relationships, and religious and
philosophical commitments." Id. Radin conceives "of commodification not as an
either/or proposition, but rather as existing on a continuum, from complete
commodification to complete noncommodification." Margaret Jane Radin, Response:
PersistentPerplexities, 11 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 305, 305 (2001). Thus, Radin
might consider priority incentives to be an interesting example of what she calls
"incomplete commodification." Id.
233. RADIN, supra note 209, at 58.
234. Id.
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longer wholly "outside" the self, in the world separate from the
person; but neither is- it wholly "inside" the self,
indistinguishable from the attributes of the person. Thus
certain categories of property can bridge the gap or blur the
boundary between the self and the world, between what is
inside and what is outside, between what is subject and what is
object.235
Radin is more concerned with the commodification of personal
property than fungible property, since the former is invested with our
personal identity and when we turn it into a market good, there is a
sense, she argues, in which we, as people, become market goods.2"6
To some commentators, cadaver organs are exactly the sorts of
items that are invested with self-constitution and human meaning.
For example, Leon Kass, chairman of the President's Council on
Bioethics,2 writes that by "[slelling our bodies, we come perilously
close to selling out our souls. ' 38 Echoing a concern about market
discourse which we return to later, Kass writes, "[t]here is even a
danger in contemplating such a prospect-for if we come to think
about ourselves like pork bellies, pork bellies we will become."2 9 And
part of his concern with being a pork belly is that it may cause us to
lose sight of uniquely special qualities of human nature: "The idea of
commodification of human flesh repels us, quite properly I would say,
because we sense that the human body especially belongs in that
category of things that defy or resist commensuration-like love or
friendship or life itself."4 '
1.

Response to Anti-Commodificationists in the Priority
Context

A big advantage of priority incentives is that they do not
commodify organs to the same extent that financial incentives do.

235.
236.

Id. at 57.
See id.

237. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, ADVISING THE PRESIDENT ON
ETHICAL ISSUES RELATED TO ADVANCES IN BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, at

http://www.bioethics.gov (last visited Aug. 25, 2003).
238. Leon Kass, Organs for Sale? Propriety,Property and the Price of Progress, 107
PUB. INT. 65, 83 (1992); see also KIMBRELL, supra note 134, at 35. Kimbrell quotes
ethicist William May as follows:
If I buy a Nobel Prize, I corrupt the meaning of the Nobel Prize. If I buy an
exemption from the draft, which was permitted in the Civil War, I corrupt
the meaning of citizenship. If I buy and sell children, I corrupt the meaning
of parenthood. And if I sell myself, I corrupt the meaning of what it is to be
human.

Id.
239.
240.

Kass, supra note 238, at 83.
Id. at 81.

2003]

A MATTER OF PRIORITY

While the commodification critique of financial incentives seems
overblown, it does count as a plus for priority incentives that they are
largely immune from such concerns. This is important either because
commodification concerns have some kernel of truth or because many
people, including those with a political voice, think that they do.24'
Something is often thought to be commodified when it can be
traded on a market, much as we trade barrels of oil or television sets.
Commodities are typically commensurable (they can be compared
and ranked in value), fumgible (they can be substituted one for the
other), and monetizable (they can be sold and converted into
dollars).242 When we allow a person to trade a commitment to donate
in exchange for priority organ receipt, we have steered clear of at
least two of these three features of commodities. Under a priority
incentive scheme, one's priority is not monetizable; you cannot sell
your priority for dollars (though we could imagine such a scheme).
Similarly, priority to receive an organ is not fungible with a
commitment to donate an organ. The two are simply not the same
kind of thing in the way that a machine engineered can opener is like
every other can opener from the same factory line.
Arguably, priority incentive schemes do promote a kind of
commensurability, raising the fear that items of personal significance
will be debased when they can be ranked in value with other items.
For example, anti-commodificationists take offense to baby-selling
since the practice may lead to an inference that a baby is only worth
the amount of money it can fetch on a market."3 These concerns can
be extended beyond just exchanges for cash. If a free market
exchange of babies were permitted, one might infer that the value of
a certain baby was roughly commensurate to the value of the baby
with whom it is exchanged.
In the case of priority incentives, however, it is hard to see the
harm in the inference at stake. Those who are induced to donate by
priority incentives may do so because they value the priority of
receiving an organ more than they value the right to not donate (or
the right to not express a view as to willingness to donate). We can
then infer from the decision to join a priority incentive program that

241. For example, Al Gore, when he was a member of the House of Representatives
from Tennessee, said that "our system of values isn't supposed to allow the auctioning
off of life to the highest bidder ....
It erodes the distinction between things and
people." Melissa M. Perry, Fragmented Bodies, Legal Privilege, and Commodification
in Science and Medicine, 51 ME. L. REV. 170, 185 (1999); see also KIMBRELL, supra note
134, at 30 (quoting then-Senator Gore's concern, in arguing for legislation banning
organ sales, that "[p]eople should not be regarded as things to be bought and sold like
parts of an automobile").
242. See RADIN, supra note 209, at 118-20 (describing indicia of commodification).
243. Id. at 97-98.
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the registrant values receiving priority more than he disvalues the
potential obligation to donate an organ. But such an inference is
harmless and is unlikely to raise the ire of anti-commodificationists.
2.

Response to Anti-Commodificationists More Generally

Even beyond the priority incentive context, fears of turning
cadaveric organs into commodities are overblown. First, cadaver
organs are not so intimately intertwined with unique features of our
personalities that we need worry if donation incentives, be they
priority-based or financially-based, impart certain commodity-like
characteristics to cadaver organs. Second, cadaver organs must have
certain
characteristics
of commodities
to
permit
organ
transplantation at all. It is only to the extent that our internal
organs are commensurable and fungible with those of others that we
can have organ transplants and a science of medicine in the first
place. Thus, we should be glad that our organs have certain
commodity-like characteristics, since we usually label the opposite
situation as disease.
If we were concerned about treating organs as commensurable,
fungible property, we should not even allow people to make gifts of
their organs.244 Yet, Leon Kass and other anti-commodificationists
have no objection to purely altruistic organ donation. Granted, a
person may feel a special connection to his own organs that he does
not feel to identical organs of another person. But do we really want
to embrace and encourage the idea that our organs have some special
meaning which makes them intimately connected with our
identities?
3.

The Dangers of Noncommodification

On the contrary, to the extent that we accept the underlying
premises of the personhood argument, we do more damage to
ourselves as persons when we elevate cadaveric organs to the special
place of honor reserved for property that should be inalienable
through market exchange. The point may be illustrated by noting
that we are perfectly willing to replace parts of our bodies with
artificial parts and that doing so should not be thought of as an
affront to our humanity. Cardiac pacemakers have been in use since
the 1950s to correct arrhythmic heartbeats.245 Such arrhythmias may
be due to a diseased sinus node, a small bit of tissue which helps to

244.

Cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: OR, ALTRUISM RUN AMUCK

11 (1993) (noting that certain extreme anticommodification positions would appear to
limit organ donation as well as sales).
245. See, e.g., Al Sokol, Tiny Implant a Lifesaver for Many, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 17,
1997, at El.
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regulate the heart's electrical activity. Should a pacemaker recipient
consider himself any less human, any less the person than he had
been before receiving the pacemaker? We could imagine that
someone would so view himself, tortured with cartoonish science
fiction imagery implying that he is now part human, part machine.
But surely that is an unnecessarily grim view. A more appropriate
conception of our identities would have us focus on our thoughts,
perceptions, and actions, making our physical bodies important only
to the extent that they affect these more important aspects of
personal identity. The idea that cadaver organs should not be bought
and sold as commodities suggests that there is something about our
organs that is intimately connected to our identities that serves to
remove them from the category of marketable, fungible property.
This is odd, however, since once we die, our bodily organs can have
no effect on our identities. To the extent that dead people have
identities at all, they are purely historical, residing in the memories
of survivors.
Similarly, a person need not experience a serious distortion of
his personal identity when he develops a diseased organ or a missing
limb, since these material items need not define a person. When a
person has a leg amputated and receives a prosthetic leg, we no
doubt expect this experience to change him in important ways. It will
likely alter his lifestyle, his freedom of motion, and his relationships
with others. But, to the extent that he is changed as a person from
receiving a prosthetic leg, it is not because his leg has been replaced
by some fungible mass-produced commodity in the form of a
prosthesis. Rather, his life is changed because there is no currently
manufacturable prosthesis that is fungible with his former leg.
Artificial organs and natural organs, to the extent that they are
perfectly fungible, are equally valuable to us. And just as artificial
organs are not vested with special aspects of our identity, our natural
organs need not be either.246

246. New medical advances will soon present a vivid challenge to the view that
human body parts are not invested with special aspects of human personality. Dr.
Peter Butler, a consulting plastic surgeon at the Royal Free Hospital in London claims
that "technology is now in place for surgeons to perform a full-face transplant."
Charles Siebert, Making Faces, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 9, 2003, at 34. Such
transplants would help "someone whose natural face has been severely disfigured
either by disease or an accident." Id.
As an empirical matter, surgeons would only transfer "the skin envelope" of the face
perhaps with some underlying muscle. Id. The recipient's bone and cartilage would
still largely determine his outward appearance, such that donor and recipient would
look far from identical. Id. If, however, there really were face transplants of the sort in
science fiction, we might entertain the notion that our faces are invested with a bit of
personhood and that we ought not part lightly with rights to our postmortem visage.
Id.
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Anti-commodificationists would have us prohibit the sale of
cadaveric organs claiming that they are intimately connected with
what it means to be human. This suggestion, however, is flawed
because it overidentifies humans with unimportant features of their
lives. The important aspects of our humanity have nothing to do with
our physical parts:
I view my uniqueness as a person as more related to
intellectual products than my bodily products. (Definitions of
personhood, for example, rarely revolve around the possession
of body parts, but rather focus on sentience or other cognitive
traits.) Arguably, it commercializes me less as a person to sell
my bone marrow than to sell my intellectual products. Thus, I
do not view payment of body parts as commercializing people. 47
C. Rhetoric and the Slippery Slope
So far I have addressed commodification concerns only in the
context of cadaveric donation. By contrast, live organ donors are
asked to part with a kind of fundamental personal property. Live
donors, by risking serious illness and sometimes even death, give up
more than just a carbon-baised organ-they give up some of their
health and life expectancy. While there are reasons to question the
commodification critique in the context of live organ donation as well,
we cannot dismiss these concerns as easily as we could in the context
of cadaveric donation.
Because I advocate priority incentives for cadaveric donation,
this issue does not directly present a problem. However, even if we
agree that cadaveric organs are not and should not be viewed as
deeply invested with our personal attributes, some might fear that
treating cadaveric organs as commodities will lead us to treat live
organs as similarly devoid of important features of human
personhood. If we develop a discourse which commodifies cadaveric
organs, some would say, this discourse will eventually be used to
describe all organ transactions. 4 ' Thus, if commodifying cadaveric
Interestingly, in a hospital survey of 120 people at Dr. Butler's hospital, "one-third
of them doctors, one-third nurses, and one-third laypeople," the majority said they
would accept someone else's face if they needed such a transplant. Id. "No one,
however, not even [Dr. Butler's] closest colleagues, said they would donate their own."
Id. Thus, incentives for face donations might be almost required in order to have any
supply at all.
247. Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 35
(1986).
248. This is the so-called "domino theory" of market rhetoric. Radin describes the
domino theory (which she does not endorse in its strong form) as holding "that there is
a slippery slope leading from toleration of any sales of something to an exclusive
market regime for that thing; and there is a further slippery slope from a market
regime for some things to a market regime encompassing everything people value."
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donation leads us to commodify live donation, some would argue, we
need to be careful about commodifying cadaveric donation as well.
There are several problems with such slippery slope arguments,
yet they are notoriously difficult to refute. They rely on hard-toassess empirical claims about the way that a complex social network
will respond to a change in policy. Before life insurance became a
common feature of the financial landscape, some thought it would
unacceptably put a price on human life.249 These fears were
overstated. Most people recognize that life insurance is designed to
play an important role in family financial planning, not to turn
people into paychecks. Similarly, I think we can count on people to
understand that the sacrifice made by live organ donors is different
in kind than the sacrifice (if any) made by cadaveric donors. To the
extent that such concerns survive, however, it counts as an
advantage of priority incentives that fears about the expansion of
market rhetoric are typically only applied to financial incentives.
D. Organ Fetishism in "Secular"Donation Policy
It is difficult to understand U.S. policy restricting cadaveric
donation incentives in secular terms. To illustrate, consider some
imaginary subgroups in the United States in disagreement over the
appropriate ways to treat dead bodies. "Territes" believe dead bodies
should be buried underground with all of their organs intact. They
believe that cremation should be illegal since cremation desecrates
the body and thereby threatens to undermine respect for the sanctity
of life. In contrast, "Cremites" believe that dead bodies should be
cremated in order to properly recognize a circle of life and a
connection between humans and nature. Cremites believe that burial
should be illegal because burial leads people to focus on the physical,
human world to the neglect of our non-physical human essence.
Despite the seemingly opposite symbolic meaning of cremation
and burial, the law permits both, and most would agree that neither
of these groups has a claim on the other to alter its beliefs and
practices. Certainly, neither presents a legal argument for
prohibiting the other's death rituals. Furthermore, we need not
resolve whether the Territes and Cremites defend their beliefs on
religious, moral, or aesthetic grounds. We recognize an autonomy
interest that allows individuals and their families some freedom in
deciding whether their dead bodies should undergo a particular
mystical ritual or none at all. 5 '

RADIN, supra note 209, at 99-100.

249. Mahoney, supra note 110, at 212 (noting that commodification concerns about
life insurance were "advanced and surmounted").
250. Some have gone so far as to convert the deceased into jewelry. In Canada, the
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Imagine now a person named Smith, who works as a smallstakes commodities trader. Smith seeks to lead an active, purposeful
existence while he is alive but believes (perhaps tautologically) that
life ends at death. He thinks that the bodies and organs of dead
people deserve no more symbolic or mystical respect than we give to
the clothing of the deceased. Since affording such respect to dead
bodies and body parts means acknowledging some sort of nonphysical world, Smith would like to have his body disposed of without
ritual. Furthermore, he would like to make his organs available upon
his death should they be useful in transplantation to promote the
health and well-being of someone still alive. Believing that his organs
are no different than anything else he might have of substantial
value in promoting life and health, he would like to sell the right to
his body after he dies. Unlike the wishes of the Territes and the
Cremites, however, Smith cannot make his preferred arrangements
for his remains without violating the law.
The commodification argument says that if we treat the human
body as a mere commodity, we will debase important features of our
personal identity. Yet this argument is similar in form to those
exchanged by the Territes and the Cremites. The commodification
argument requires us to recognize something special about cadaver
body parts which make them different than the commodities that we
trade every day. The argument differs, however, from the Territe and
Cremite arguments in that it lies at the heart of our current
(presumably secular) organ donation policy. Hence, unlike the
imaginary arguments of the Territes and Cremites, it actually does
restrict people's freedom to dispose of their bodies.
Referring
to
markets
for
cadaver
organs,
anticommodificationists have argued that "those whose organs and
tissues are taken in the context of a financial reward are 'sources,'
not donors" and that "one could argue that once the donation occurs,
particularly of multiple organs, the body is treated as 'a thing,' often
with total failure by the procurement team to maintain the
individual dignity of the donor.'"" However, notions of what it means
to treat a dead body with dignity are hardly universal. Until the

remains of eighty-year-old Edna MacArthur "were compressed into a 3-gram sample
and flown to Italy where an Italian firm use[d] intense heat to incorporate the remains
into carbon used to craft a diamond" to be made into a ring for MacArthur's
granddaughter.
CNN.com,
Family Turns Grandma Into Diamond, at
http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/12/31/offbeat.canada.diamond.ap
(Dec. 31, 2002).
Interestingly, the diamond cost the family just over 2,000 U.S.D., which is well below
the cost of a traditional burial. Id.
251. A.L. Caplan et al., FinancialCompensation for Cadaver Organ Donation: Good
Idea or Anathema?, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 220 (Arthur L. Caplan &
Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998).
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1960s, the Wari', a native people of the Amazon rain forest, engaged
in a practice known as funerary cannibalism. At funerals, the Wari'
"consumed members of their own group who died naturally.., out of
affection and respect for the dead person and as a way to help
survivors cope with their grief."52 According to anthropologist Beth
Conklin who studies the Wari', "in the past, the idea of leaving the
body of a loved one in the dirt and letting it rot was as repulsive to
'
the Wari' as the idea of eating human flesh is to us."253
It is a
challenge, indeed, for anti-commodificationists to offer secular,
generalizable principles to govern the "dignified" treatment of
cadaveric donors.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is important that we not allow inertia to guide organ allocation
policy forever. If we already had a priority incentive system, I
strongly suspect that it would have very limited opposition. Such an
incentive scheme would promote organ supply and save lives while
better respecting the contribution made by those who register to
donate. Priority incentive schemes do not favor registered donors
because registered donors are somehow more virtuous than others;
rather, they favor registered donors in order to create an incentive to
join a mutual insurance pool. Those who deliberately decline to join
are not entitled to the full benefits of others' contributions.
As a guiding principle, we might seek to create a priority
distribution that is pareto superior to our current distribution.
Priority incentives are sufficiently flexible such that we can adjust
the level of priority distributed to make virtually everyone share in
the benefits. Alternatively, we might decide to more aggressively
induce donations. Either way, such decisions will be better informed
after conducting empirical research to understand the magnitude of
the relationship between the amount of priority we allocate and the
amount of donor registration we induce.
Priority incentives can potentially be attacked from two sidesby those who say such incentives are too commercial and by those
who say they are not commercial enough. Those who find them too
commercial argue that priority incentives reduce both altruistic
behavior and opportunities to act altruistically. I have argued that
they will certainly not reduce opportunities to act altruistically,
because they will increase donors' range of opportunities.
Furthermore, they do not necessarily reduce altruistic behavior,

252. Press Release, Vanderbilt University, Giving Cannibalism a Human Face
(Aug. 15, 2001), available at http://www.exploration.vanderbilt.edu/print/pdfs/
news/newscannibalism.pdf.
253. Id.
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since those with priority are still making a donation, they are just
donating to a pool that limits access. If I throw a dinner party for all
of my friends who have supported me during a difficult year, I am
still acting altruistically, even though I limit the scope of my
generosity to people with whom I share a reciprocal giving
relationship. Furthermore, even if priority incentives were to reduce
altruistic behavior, the altruism in our current system is not nearly
so robust and easy to identify as is commonly suggested, and
altruistic donation is by no means an unadulterated good, especially
when we observe how a fixation on altruistic donation costs human
lives.
Those who find donation incentives too commercial also argue
that they reduce human flourishing. I noted that this
commodification critique is not applicable to priority incentives and
is not very convincing in the context of financial incentives.
Cadaveric organs are best thought of as tools to human flourishing
that are substitutable with any equally effective tool, like an
artificial organ. When a person risks his health and life expectancy to
donate an organ while still alive, he does give up something deeply
personal. However, when a person agrees to sell rights to his
postmortem organs or to exchange such rights for in-kind
compensation, he has made a deal to promote the human flourishing
of someone else who would not otherwise have long to flourish.
A challenge to priority incentives from the opposite direction
would say that they are not commercial enough-that they would not
provide as strong of an incentive to register to donate as would
financial incentives. I have focused less on this perspective because,
as I have noted, financial incentives are not at all incompatible with
priority incentives, since both programs can be combined. Also, what
little empirical data is available on the subject suggests that
financial incentives, unless substantial, may not have a very
powerful effect on rates of donation. 54 Importantly, priority
incentives offer something that financial incentives typically do not.
Most financial incentive programs limit commerce in organs to the
payment of those who donate or agree to donate. No politicallyacceptable financial incentive program on the horizon allows
wealthier people to purchase better access to the cadaveric organ
supply. So long as that is true, a priority program will incentivize
donors with something money cannot buy-namely, preferred access
to the organ supply. From that perspective, priority incentives may
do much more to incentivize donation than financial incentives.
Furthermore, priority incentives are essentially cost free-another
factor which makes them more politically appetizing than financial

254.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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incentives.
A further advantage of priority incentives is that they are less
subject to commodification concerns than are financial incentives.
Priority incentives do not so much raise the ire of anticommodificationists-a plus from a political perspective, even if we
doubt the force of their critique. Also, some object to financial
incentive schemes because they create differential incentives based
on wealth. In all likelihood, under a financial incentive scheme,
cadaveric organs would disproportionately be supplied by families
with less wealth because they would most value whatever monetary
compensation is offered. A priority incentive scheme is much less
likely to have wealth-based distributional effects. In fact, under a
priority
incentive
scheme,
cadaveric
organs
may
be
disproportionately supplied by hypochondriacs and those who are
otherwise anxious about their health-a group thought to need less
protection than the poor and, if anything, probably has above average
wealth.
Priority incentives mix sound, equitable policy with at least
plausible aspirations for political success. They would expand control
over our own bodies by increasing our freedom to make agreements
directing
the
disposition
of our
remains.
Some
anticommodificationists would limit these freedoms with ostensibly
secular principles rooted in human dignity. In fact, such views reflect
a kind of organ fetish that asks us to treat cadaveric body parts as
having mystical power. So long as we trust people to recognize the
very obvious differences between cadavers and living humans, we
should not fear that commodification of the former will commodify
the latter. Such fears are particularly harmful in the context of organ
donation where the fetishistic treatment of dead bodies causes us to
discard vital organs that would otherwise save lives.

